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CRIMINAL LAW
Carolyn V. Grady *
JenniferM. Newman*
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This article summarizes most published criminal law decisions
of the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia Court of Appeals
sitting en banc, issued between July 1, 1998 and July 1, 1999.1 This
article also includes selected published panel opinions of the Virginia
Court of Appeals and a summary of the most significant criminal
law enactments from the 1999 session of the Virginia General
Assembly.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. FourthAmendment-Search and Seizure
1. Application to Aliens
InKasi v. Commonwealth,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld
* Of Counsel, Epperly, Follis & Schork, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. BA., 1985, Skidmore
College; J.D., 1989, Boston College School of Law.
** Candidate, J.D., 2000, University offRichmondSchool ofLaw; B.A., 1994, Pennsylvania
State University. Ms. Newman currently works with Carolyn V. Grady.
1. Along with the decisions summarized in this article, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed, without a separate opinion, the following decisions of the Virginia Court ofAppeals:
(1) Commonwealth v. Price, 256 Va. 373, 506 S.E.2d 317 (1998), affg 25 Va. App. 655, 492
S.E.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated
when he was held in custody until trial, a period in excess of five months based upon a finding
of probable cause); (2) Lynn v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 239, 514 S.E.2d 147 (1999), afg 27
Va. App. 336, 499 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the trial court properly refused the
defendant's proffered instructions on "cooling off," "right to arm," and "relative strength and
size"). The Virginia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, also published the following decisions,
without separate opinions: (1) Epps v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 169, 510 S.E.2d 279 (Ct.
App. 1999) (affirming the judgment of the trial court but withdrawing the panel decision of
the court of appeals in Epps v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 58, 502 S.E.2d 140 (Ct. App.
1998)); (2) Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 562, 507 S.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1998)
(affirming the judgment of the trial court). See Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 27Va. App. 453,
499 S.E.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1998), for the court's panel decision.
2. 256 Va. 407, 508 S.E.2d 57 (1998). The case came before the Supreme Court of
Virginia on automatic appeal of Kasi's death sentence. The court consolidated this appeal
with the appeal of the capital murder conviction, however the defendant did not perfect his
appeals of the noncapital convictions. See id. at 413, 508 S.E.2d at 60.
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the defendant's convictions for capital murder and other offenses in
connection with the shooting of Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
employees. The supreme court held that (1) the defendant's forcible
abduction from Pakistan was not prohibited by an extradition treaty;
(2) the Fourth Amendment does not protect aliens in foreign
territories or in international waters from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and (3) the defendant's roommate, a lessee of the
apartment, had the authority
to consent to the search of a suitcase
4
closet.
hall
a
in
found
The defendant in Kasi was a native of Pakistan and resided in an
apartment with a friend in Fairfax County. The day afLer the
shootings, the defendant returned to Pakistan. Nearly four and onehalf years later, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") apprehended the defendant in a hotel room in Pakistan.'
There is no extradition treaty directly between the United States
and Pakistan, but the Attorney General assumed, as represented by
the defendant, that the Extradition Treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom is in force in Pakistan. The supreme
court held that there is nothing in this treaty that prohibits the
"forcible abduction" of the defendant.7
Referring to United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,8 the supreme
court stated that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the
defendant because the Amendment was not intended "to apply to
activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign
territory or in international waters."9
The record established that the defendant's roommate, a lessee of
the apartment, consented to the search of a suitcase found in the
hall closet. The supreme court upheld the trial court's finding that
the roommate had the authority to consent to the search of the
suitcase.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

°

See id. at 407, 508 S.E.2d at 57.
See id. at 417-20, 508 S.E.2d at 62-64.
See id. at 412, 508 S.E.2d at 59.
See id. at 414, 508 S.E.2d at 60-61.
See id. at 417-18, 508 S.E.2d at 62-63.
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Kasi, 256 Va. at 419, 508 S.E.2d at 63.
See id. at 420, 508 S.E.2d at 64.
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2. Blanket Waiver as a Condition of Suspended Sentence
In Anderson v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld a "blanket waiver" on certain probation conditions. 12 The
court held that (1) the waiver of the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights was given knowingly and voluntarily and was not the result
of coercion; (2) the condition was not overly broad; and
13 (3) the
circumstances.
the
considering
reasonable
was
condition
In this case, Anderson received a suspended sentence after
pleading guilty to felonious possession of a firearm upon school
property. One of the conditions of his suspended sentence was that
"he... submit his person, place of residence, and propertyto search
or seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement
officer with or without a warrant."14 The agreement also stated that
"by his signature below, [Anderson] acknowledges that, if this
agreement is accepted by the court, he understands he is waiving his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures during the period specified above." 5
Approximately five months later, two off-duty police officers saw
Anderson and two friends exiting a van, acting "very loud'" in public.
The officers approached the three men, at which point Anderson
dropped a "'small white baggie."" 6 Upon Anderson's arrest, the
officer seized that baggie as well as another baggie and a backpack
that contained a handgun.' 7
A panel of the Virginia Court ofAppeals affirmed the trial court's
finding that Anderson's waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in
the plea agreement was valid.'" The court of appeals, sitting en banc,
also affirmed the trial court's finding. 9 The supreme court agreed
with the court of appeals and found that Anderson's plea agreement
containing the waiver was voluntary and not the result of coercion. °
The supreme court also reasoned that because the purpose of the
waiver was to ensure Anderson's good conduct, the scope of the

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

256 Va. 580, 507 S.E.2d 339 (1998).
See id. at 586-87, 507 S.E.2d at 342.
See id.
Id. at 582, 507 S.E.2d at 340.
Id. at 582-83, 507 S.E.2d at 340 (alteration in original).
Id. at 583, 507 S.E.2d at 341.
See id. at 583-84, 507 S.E.2d at 341.
See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 565, 490 S.E.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1997).
See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 535, 495 S.E.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1998) (en

banc).
20. See Anderson, 256 Va. at 585, 507 S.E.2d at 341.
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waiver needed to be broad. Finally, the court found that because the
waiver required Anderson to submit to "any law enforcement
officer," the search did not have to be related to the defendant's
probation nor did the searching officer have to have prior knowledge
of the waiver.2 '
3. Detention: Reasonable Suspicion
In Welshman v. Commonwealth,2 the Virginia Court of Appeals
decided the following issues: (1) whether an officer's order to a group
of people to lie down on the sidewalk with their arms extended out
from their bodies was constitutionally justified; and (2) whether the
officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to search the defendant after he refused to extend his arms from his body as directed
by the officer.23
In this case, the Lynchburg Police Department was conducting a
surveillance in the 2100 block of Main Street when they observed
two individuals in the middle of the street exchange cash with
pedestrians and drivers for what appeared to be crack cocaine. The
area was known as an "open-air drug market" in which the police
had responded to numerous calls of drug activity and shooting
incidents. As four officers approached the scene, the two suspects
moved onto the sidewalk where a group of people were standing.
One of the approaching officers directed everyone on the sidewalk to
lie down with their arms extended out from their bodies in order to
ensure the safety of the officers and other pedestrians.24 Everyone
complied with the officer's directive except the defendant, who did
not extend his arms out from his body, but instead kept them under
his torso. The officer, who feared the defendant might be armed,
approached the defendant and told him again to extend his arms.
The defendant again refused to follow the officer's order, so the
officer rolled the defendant over and searched for a weapon. When
the officer did not see a weapon on the ground where the defendant
had been lying, the officer conducted a pat-down of the defendant.
During the pat-down, the officer felt several smaller wrapped objects
in the defendant's left front pants pocket. The officer concluded the
objects were crack cocaine and pulled them from the defendant's

21.
22.
23.
24.

See id.
28 Va.
See id.
See id.

at 586, 507 S.E.2d at 342.
App. 20, 502 S.E.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
at 29, 34, 502 S.E.2d at 126, 129.
at 26-27, 502 S.E.2d at 125.
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pocket.' This search revealed "five or six chunks of crack cocaine,"
as well as $150 in cash.26 Other than the defendant and the two
suspects, the officers did not frisk anyone else."
The trial court denied Welshman's motion to suppress, finding
that the officers "acted properly and had reasonable probability or
reasonable basis to believe that the area involved was very dangerous; that it was a high crime area," and as a result the officers'
"actions were reasonable."2" A divided panel of the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's decision and held that the cocaine was
discovered as a result of an unreasonable seizure of the defendant's
person, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 9
On appeal to the full court, the Commonwealth conceded that the
defendant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when he was directed to lie down on the sidewalk with his arms
extended out from his body, and that the officers did not have a
reason to believe that the defendant was involved in criminal
activity."0 The court of appeals reviewed several United States
Supreme Court cases involving the brief detention of individuals,
and concluded that the officer was justified in ordering everyone to
lie down on the ground, in order to ensure his safety and the safety
of the bystanders."' The court reasoned that the officer was justified
in legally detaining the individuals on the sidewalk because of the
existence of the following factors: (1) the number of people in close
proximity to the targeted individuals; (2) the reputation of the house
and block for violence; and (3) the nature of the crime suspected by
the two individuals who were targeted.32 The court of appeals held
that the refusal of a person to show his hands, in addition to the
reputation of the neighborhood, provided the officer with "specific
and articulable facts giving rise to the reasonable belief [defendant]
'might be armed and dangerous." 33

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id. at 27-28, 502 S.E.2d at 126.
Id. at 28, 502 S.E.2d at 126.
See id.
Id.
See Welshman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 599, 492 S.E.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1997).
See Welshman, 28 Va.App. at 29, 502 S.E.2d at 126.
See id. at 30-32, 502 S.E.2d at 127-28.
See id. at 32, 502 S.E.2d at 128.
Id. at 35, 502 S.E.2d at 129.
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4. Expectation of Privacy
In Bramblett v. Commonwealth,3 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of two packages mailed to his sister a year before the
offenses were committed because the packages were addressed to
her and in her exclusive possession. Further, she had the authority
to consent to a search of the boxes. 5
A panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals decided a case of first
impression in Williams v. Commonwealth.3 6 The court held that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
boots that had been lawfully seized upon his arrest. 37 The facts at
trial indicated that while the defendant was incarcerated on an
unrelated charge, his personal belongings, including his boots, were
stored at the facility. His boots were examined and found to match
a print on the wall of a law office where a murder had been committed. The court held that "[because the boots were in the lawful
custody of the sheriff, the examination of the boots imposed no
greater intrusion on [the defendant's] privacy." 8
5. Probable Cause to Search
In Hayes v. Commonwealth,3 9 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that the police officer lacked probable cause to search
the defendant while executing a search warrant of a private
residence where the defendant was present. The court also found
that the officer exceeded the scope of any permissible frisk for
weapons.40

34. 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400(1999).
35. See id. at 274, 513 S.E.2d at 408. In this case the defendant mailed two packages to
his sister in Indiana. See id. at 270, 513 S.E.2d at 405. Almost a year later, after the
defendant had been questioned concerning the charges of murder, the defendant's sister
called the local police and consented to a search of the boxes. See id. The packages contained
photographs of the murder victims and audiotapes of the defendant's voice, in which he
expressed a sexual interest in one of the children and a belief that her parents were trying
to "set him up." Id.
36. 29 Va. App. 297, 512 S.E.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1999).
37. See id. at 303, 512 S.E.2d at 136.
38. Id. at 303, 512 S.E.2d at 136; see id. at 300-01, 512 S.E.2d at 134-35.
39. 29 Va. App. 647, 514 S.E.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1999).
40. See id. at 658-60, 514 S.E.2d at 362-64.
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On October 31,1996, Officer Lowery participated in the execution
of a search warrant on a private residence. He testified that the
target of the search was cocaine inside the duplex and that no one
was named in the warrant. The accompanying affidavit indicated
that there were people and cocaine present in the duplex when the
informant left, but it did not indicate when the informant left, nor
did it describe any of the people present. When the officer arrived,
the defendant was seated on a couch on the porch beside the
entrance to the duplex.4 1 The defendant was not known to the officer
and the officer had not seen him engage in any suspicious behavior.
Officer Lowery testified that he ordered the defendant to the ground
and handcuffed him, for safety reasons, and conducted a pat-down
for weapons. During the pat-down, the officer felt and squeezed an
object in the defendant's shirt pocket. This object was seized and the
defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine. The officer did not
testify that he suspected the object was a weapon, nor did he clearly
testify that he believed the object to be cocaine.4 2
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. A panel
of the court of appeals, however, overruled this decision and held
"that neither the issuance of the search warrant nor the risk of
danger to the officers during [the] execution [of the warrant]
provided Officer Lowery with probable cause to conduct a full search
of [the defendant]." 4 3 The court stated that the search warrant was
for a private residence and neither it nor the accompanying affidavit
named or described any person to be searched during the execution.
Further, there was no evidence that Officer Lowery knew the
defendant or suspected him of engaging in suspicious behavior."
While the court of appeals found that the officer was justified in
concluding that the defendant was an occupant of the residence,
subject to detention and a frisk for weapons, the court held that the
officer exceeded the permissible scope ofthis frisk.4 5 The court stated
that because the character of the object was not immediately
apparent to the officer during the pat-down, the officer was not
permitted to investigate the object further.4 6

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 649, 514 S.E.2d at 358.
See id. at 649-51, 514 S.E.2d at 358-59.
Id. at 653, 658, 514 S.E.2d at 360, 362.
See id. at 658, 514 S.E.2d at 362.
See id. at 659, 514 S.E.2d at 363.
See id. at 660, 514 S.E.2d at 363.
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6. Search Warrant
A panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals addressed an issue of
first impression in Lebedun v. Commonwealth.4' The issue was
whether the Commonwealth carried the burden of proving that an
affidavit was attached to the search warrant when the defendant
moved to suppress the evidence that was seized pursuant to the
search warrant.48 The court held that when the defendant moved to
suppress evidence obtained during the execution of a search
warrant, the defendant had the burden of proving that the warrant
and the affidavit were not attached at the time of execution.49
The court of appeals addressed several other issues in this appeal
as well. In this case, two men wearing masks, wigs, and gloves
robbed a pharmacy in Fairfax County of both narcotics and money.5 °
As the shorter man left the store and entered a car, one of the
victims saw him remove his mask. This victim later identified the
man as Worth Myers, which enabled a search warrant to be obtained
and executed at Myers's home.5 The police also obtained a search
warrant for the defendant's home, based on the accompanying
affidavit. 2 This affidavit stated that "a fatal drug overdose had
occurred at Myers'[s] apartment, that an informant had purchased
prescription drugs from Myers, and that ...

Myers had told the

informant how he and [the defendant], while wearing masks,
committed a series of armed robberies of pharmacies."" It also
stated that "Myers gave statements... as to his involvement in the
armed robberies. In his statement [Myers] implicated [the defendant] as the second subject in the robberies."54 The warrant itself
failed to recite the offense, but the affidavit expressly stated that the
search pertained to charges of robbery and abduction.55 A panel of
the court of appeals found that Myers's statements contained in the
affidavit were made against his penal interest and constituted

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

27 Va. App. 697, 501 S.E.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 701, 501 S.E.2d at 430.
See id. at 711-12, 501 S.E.2d at 434.
See id. at 704, 501 S.E.2d at 430.
See id. at 704-05, 501 S.E.2d at 430-31.
See id. at 705, 501 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 707, 501 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 707, 501 S.E.2d at 432.
See id. at 709, 501 S.E.2d at 433.
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reliable information upon which the magistrate could find probable
cause to issue a search warrant.56
7. Security Checkpoint
In Wilson v. Commonwealth," a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals found that the security checkpoint where the police stopped
the defendant's automobile was unconstitutional." The court stated
that the Commonwealth failed to present any of the following
evidence: (1) that there was a drug dealing problem in the area of
the security checkpoint; (2) that there had been any drug-related
arrests made as a result of the checkpoint that night; (3) that there
had ever been any arrests made for drug dealing in that area; and
(4) that security checkpoints like the one in this case were effective
tools in combating illegal drug dealing.59
8. Search Incident to Arrest
In Glascov. Commonwealth,0 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the defendant, who voluntarily left his car when contacted by
the arresting officer, was a recent occupant of the car, and therefore
the officer
was permitted to search the interior of the car incident to
1
6

arrest.

The facts illustrated that the officer was on patrol when he
noticed the defendant's car. The officer was familiar with the
defendant because he had arrested him two weeks earlier for failure
to pay traffic fines. Suspecting that the defendant's license was
suspended, the officer followed the defendant while contacting the
dispatcher to determine the status of the defendant's license. Before
he received a response, the defendant parked his car, got out, and
headed toward a house.6 2 The officer then pulled his car behind the
defendant's, activated his lights, stopped, and asked the defendant
if he had a valid driver's license. The defendant turned, walked
towards the officer, and showed the officer an identification card, but
not a driver's license. The officer arrested the defendant for driving
56. See id. at 707-08, 501 S.E.2d at 432.
57. 29 Va. App. 63, 509 S.E.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1999).
58. See id. at 69, 509 S.E.2d at 543.
59. See id. at 68-69, 509 S.E.2d at 543. The court made this decision based on the
balancing test enunciated in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See Wilson, 29 Va. App. at
67, 509 S.E.2d at 542.
60. 257 Va. 433, 513 S.E.2d 137(1999).
61. See id. at 441, 513 S.E.2d at 142.
62. See id. at 435, 513 S.E.2d at 138.
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on a suspended license when he learned, based on the DMV check,
that the defendant's license was indeed suspended. In a search of the
defendant's person, the officer found two small bags of marijuana,
$650 in cash, and a pager. Another officer conducted a search of the
defendant's car and found a handgun and a bag of crack cocaine.63
The supreme court held that:
when a police officer observes an automobile, follows it because of his or her
prior knowledge regarding the vehicle and its suspected driver, and arrests
the driver in close proximity to the vehicle immediately after the driver exits
the automobile .... the arrestee is a recent occupant of the vehicle within the

limits of the Belton rule.'

The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals's holding that

of the defendant's vehicle
the search of the passenger compartment
65
was a lawful search incident to arrest.

In Rhodes v. Commonwealth,6 the Virginia Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's finding that a police officer lawfully
searched the defendant incident to issuing him a summons for
violation of a city ordinance. 7
The evidence showed that the defendant was standing in the front
yard of a private residence when the officer saw him place a beer
bottle on the porch.68 The defendant told the officer he placed the
bottle on the porch "because it was open."69 The officer testified that
he intended to "release [the defendant] on a summons.7 However,
before releasing the defendant, the officer asked him if he was
carrying any weapons or narcotics. After the defendant answered no,
the officer conducted a pat-down and felt a small rock in the
defendant's pants pocket. The officer then examined the rock and
arrested the defendant for possession of cocaine."
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress and a
divided panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

63. See id. at 436, 513 S.E.2d at 138-39.
64. Id. at 441, 513 S.E.2d at 142.
65. See id. Justice Lacy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Koontz joined. See
id. at 441-48, 513 S.E.2d at 142-46 (Lacy, J., concurring).
66. 29 Va. App. 641, 513 S.E.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1999) (en banc).
67. See id. at 642, 513 S.E.2d at 905.
68. See id. at 645, 513 S.E.2d at 906.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 643, 513 S.E.2d at 905.
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court's ruling.7 2 Upon a rehearing en banc, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's finding.73 In its opinion, the court reviewed
the law of searches incident to lawful arrests. Relying on a recent
United States Supreme Court decision that rejected Iowa's reasoning
that allowed searches incident to citations,7 4 the court held that
absent "a need to disarm" the defendant or a need "to preserve any
evidence" of the offense, an officer's search of a defendant incident
to a citation is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.7'
9. Seizure
In Langston v. Commonwealth,7 6 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that an encounter between police and the defendant
was not consensual, but was a seizure under the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 7 However, the court upheld the defendant's
convictions finding that the defendant's stop and search were
supported by reasonable suspicion.78
The facts at trial indicated that three uniformed bicycle officers
were patrolling a high drug area. After seeing the defendant in a
yard posted with a "no trespassing sign," the officers followed the
defendant down an alley and questioned him about his identity. The
defendant told the officers he was going to the store and then to his
girlfriend's house. The officers noticed that the defendant was
wearing a long coat that extended to his knees and that he kept
touching his right side. The officers asked the defendant if he was
carrying drugs or weapons. When he responded negatively, the
officers conducted a pat-down of the defendant, found a handgun in
the right side of his pants, and arrested him. No other contraband
was found in the subsequent search incident to arrest; however, the
officers found a bag of cocaine on the floor of the police van when it
arrived at the police station. The defendant was charged with
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and simultaneous
possession of cocaine and a firearm.7 9
Ruling that the encounter between the police and the defendant
was consensual and the officers had conducted a Terry stop sup-

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 296, 504 S.E.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1998).
See Rhodes, 29 Va. App. at 645-46, 513 S.E.2d at 907.
See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
Rhodes, 29 Va. App. at 645, 513 S.E.2d at 906-07.
28 Va. App. 276, 504 S.E.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 283, 504 S.E.2d at 383.
See id. at 287, 504 S.E.2d at 385.
See id. at 280-81, 504 S.E.2d at 381-82.

868

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:857

ported by reasonable suspicion, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress.8 ° A panel of the court of appeals found
that the trial court's ruling was erroneous and that the encounter
was a seizure.8 ' The court held that no reasonable person would
have felt free to leave considering the following circumstances: (1)
three officers pursued him; (2) the officers were close enough to carry
on a conversation; (3) the officers harassed him with repeated
questions; and (4) the officers surrounded him when he stopped
walking.82 However, the court upheld defendant's conviction, finding
that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop and search the
defendant because they saw him on abandoned property that was
posted with a "no trespassing sign," and his actions of patting his
side 8created
a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and danger3
ous.

10. Strip Search: Reasonable Suspicion
In Taylor v. Commonwealth,84 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that his
belligerence to a strip search did not constitute reasonable suspicion
to support a strip search following an arrest for marijuana intoxication.85
In this case, the defendant was arrested for public intoxication by
drugs. The officer's frisk and pat-down of the defendant did not
reveal any contraband. The officer stated that finding nothing raised
his suspicions, so when they reached the jail, the officer informed the
defendant that he would be strip searched. When the defendant
became belligerent and combative, the officer called for the assistance of two additional deputies. A strip search revealed a bag of
cocaine protruding from the defendant's anus. 6
The court held that "[a]n arrest for public intoxication by drugs
justifies a search of the arrestee incidental to the arrest," but "when
the search reveals nothing and does not raise any further suspicions,

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
28 Va.
See id.
See id.

at 281, 504 S.E.2d at 382.
at 282-83, 504 S.E.2d at 383.
at 283, 504 S.E.2d at 383.
at 284, 287, 504 S.E.2d at 384-85.
App. 638, 507 S.E.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1998).
at 640, 644, 507 S.E.2d at 662, 665.
at 640-41, 507 S.E.2d at 663.
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no reasonable suspicion exists that contraband must still be on the
person and can only be revealed by a strip search.""7
11. Warrantless Entry: Reasonable Suspicion
In Washington v. Commonwealth,"8 the Virginia Court ofAppeals
held that (1) officers going to an address supplied by a bail bondsman in search of a wanted felon does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment; (2) the officers had a reasonable belief that the person
exiting the house was the wanted person; and (3) they could
accompany the person into the house while attempting to verify his
identity.89
A bondsman received an anonymous tip that Reginald Ford had
an outstanding warrant and could be found at 2347 Bethel Street in
Richmond. The bondsman contacted an officer who verified that a
capias was outstanding, but did not obtain a copy of the capias or a
description of Ford. The bondsman knew Ford and could recognize
him. When the officer and the bondsman knocked on the front door
of 2347 Bethel Street in an attempt to arrest Ford, the defendant,
Washington, exited the rear door and was stopped by two other
officers.9" When the defendant was asked if he was Ford, he replied,
"[N]o. I'm Welford Washington." 1 The officer frisked the defendant,
and asked for his identification; the defendant responded that his
identification was inside the house. The officer then escorted the
defendant into the house where he saw narcotics on the kitchen
table. The officers seized the drugs and arrested the defendant. Ford
was never found at the address.92
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress.93 In a
panel opinion, the court of appeals reversed the convictions.94
However, on rehearing en banc, the court of appeals reversed the
panel and affirmed the defendant's convictions. 95 The court stated
that either the bondsman or the officers "could lawfully approach
any citizen and ask if he were Ford" because there was an outstanding capias for Ford's arrest and the bondsman had pledged to

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 644, 507 S.E.2d at 664.
29 Va. App. 5, 509 S.E.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1999) (en banc).
See id. at 9, 509 S.E.2d at 514.
See id. at 9-10, 509 S.E.2d at 514.
Id. at 9, 509 S.E.2d at 514.
See id at 9-10, 509 S.E.2d at 514.
See id. at 9, 509 S.E.2d at 514.
See Washington v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 657,496 S.E.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1998).
See Washington, 29 Va. App. at 16, 509 S.E.2d at 514.
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produce Ford.96 The court held that the capias gave the officers
probable cause to arrest, and the corroborated anonymous tip gave
the officers the reasonable belief that the defendant was Ford.9 v The
court held that the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated
when the officer verified that there was an outstanding capias for
Ford and took the bondsman to the address to identify Ford." The
court also stated that the defendant's exiting through the back door
in response to a knock on the front door provided the officers with
"articulable facts that [also] corroborated the tip."99 Finally, the
court held that the officer was entitled to verify the defendant's
identification after he had detained him at the back door.00 Relying
on the decision of Servis v. Commonwealth,"° the court of appeals
held that the officer was authorized to escort the defendant into the
house in order to maintain the status quo, prevent the fugitive from
escaping, and ensure officer safety. 10 2 The seizure of the contraband
was not a result
of an illegal entry or search, but a result of the open
10 3

view doctrine.

The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed another warrantless
entry issue in Bramblett v. Commonwealth.0 4 In this case, the issue
before the court was whether the warrantless opening of a motel
room door invalidated the seizure of evidence later obtained from the
motel room with a search warrant. 10 5 The supreme court upheld the
trial court's findings and held that the warrantless opening of the
motel room door did 0not
invalidate the evidence seized pursuant to
6
the search warrant.

The facts at trial indicated that in an earlier conversation with an
officer, the defendant expressed his thoughts about committing
suicide and agreed to meet the officer at noon. When the defendant
failed to keep this appointment, the officer became concerned about
the defendant's safety based on their earlier conversations. Two
officers went to the defendant's motel, observed his car parked

96. Id. at 10, 509 S.E.2d at 514.
97. See id. at 12, 509 S.E.2d at 515.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 13, 509 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) and
Jones v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 14, 19, 334 S.E.2d 536, 540 (1985)).
101. 6 Va. App. 507, 371 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1988).
102. See Washington, 29 Va. App. at 14, 509 S.E.2d at 516-17.
103. See id. at 16, 509 S.E.2d at 516.
104. 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400 (1999).
105. See id. at 275, 513 S.E.2d 408.
106. See id.
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outside, and knocked on the motel room door. When there was no
response, the officers asked the motel owner to open the door to the
defendant's room, which was empty.1" 7 "One officer 'stepped into the
doorway'... while the other officer 'stood beside the door." 08 Neither
officer had entered the room when the defendant arrived in a
taxicab. Later the same day, the brother of one of the murder victims
went to the motel room, wearing a "wire." He reported to the police
that he had seen a bullet in a chair. The police obtained a warrant
and searched the motel room the next day.'0 9
12. Warrantless Entry and Search: Consent
In McNair v. Commonwealth,"' a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals decided that "once valid consent is given, the police may
conduct a reasonable search of a residence until the consent is
unequivocally withdrawn.""'
In this case, the police "responded to a report that there was a
robbery in progress at [the defendant's] apartment."" 2 Upon the
officers' arrival, the defendant consented to a search of his apartment to "'look for anyone that may have done the robbery or any
individuals that [may] need assistance.""'3 After an emergency crew
removed a victim from the apartment, an officer went upstairs to
look for any evidence that the robbers may have left behind. The
officer found a glass test tube containing cocaine in plain view. The
defendant was arrested and convicted of possession of cocaine." 4 The
court found that the defendant had "(1) consented to the officer's
presence in the apartment for the purpose of investigating the
robbery, (2) observed the [officer] go upstairs, and (3) knew that the
[officer] was searching for clues."" 5 The court of appeals found that
the defendant's "failure to withdraw his consent is evidence that he
consented to the [officer's] search.""'

107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. 29 Va. App. 559,561,513 S.E.2d 866,867 (Ct. App. 1999), reh'ggranted,30 Va. App.
84,515 S.E.2d 848 (Ct. App. 1999).
111. Id. at 565, 513 S.E.2d at 868.
112. Id. at 564, 513 S.E.2d at 867.
113. Id. at 562, 513 S.E.2d at 867.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 564, 513 S.E.2d at 868.
116. Id.
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In Commonwealth v. Benjamin,117 a panel of the Virginia Court
of Appeals held that the defendant's arrest was unlawful and
constituted an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." 8 In this case, the defendant was wanted for questioning about his involvement in a double homicide. Police officers were
watchingthe suspect's apartment when they observed a person walk
towards it. The officers knocked on the apartment door and said they
were looking for someone named "Rosheen Waller," nicknamed
"Shaw." The defendant stated that his name was "Shamaal
Benjamin" and that Waller lived somewhere else. The police officers
left his apartment and encountered another young male, who they
confirmed was not "Shaw." This young male told the officers that
"Shaw" lived in the apartment they just left. The officers proceeded
back to the first apartment and knocked on the door." 9 When the
defendant's mother opened the door, two officers "stepped over the
threshold .

.

. and asked to speak [with the defendant]." 2 ° The

officers took the defendant outside where the young male identified
him as "Shaw." 2 ' The court found that "the officers did not have
consent to enter [the defendant's apartment]" and seize him, and
that there
were "no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless
122
entry.

"

B. Fifth Amendment
1. Knowing, Voluntary, Intelligent Waiver
As summarized earlier in this article, the defendant in Kasi v.
Commonwealth 21 signed a waiver of his rights and gave both an oral
and written confession two days after his arrest, while he was being
flown from Pakistan to Fairfax County. 24 The evidence showed the
following facts: (1) the FBI neither threatened nor made promises to
the defendant; (2) the defendant understood both English and his
rights; (3) the defendant never refused to answer a question and
never expressed fear; and (4) the FBI never coerced the defendant."

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

28 Va. App. 548, 507 S.E.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 552, 507 S.E.2d at 115-16.
See id. at 550-51, 507 S.E.2d at 113-14.
Id. at 551, 507 S.E.2d at 114.
See id.
Id. at 552, 507 S.E.2d at 114.
256 Va. 407, 508 S.E.2d 57 (1998).
See id. at 412, 508 S.E.2d at 59; see also supra Part II.A.1.
See id. at 416, 508 S.E.2d at 62.

1999]

CRIMINAL LAW

The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the trial court's ruling
that "the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent [was] fully
supported by the record."'2 6
In Commonwealth v. Benjamin,2 7 a panel of the Virginia Court
of Appeals held that reading the defendant his rights in a jumbled
and unintelligible manner was equivalent to failing to advise him of
his Fifth Amendment rights; therefore, the defendant's waiver of
these rights was not "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."' 2 After
watching a videotape of the defendant's interrogation, the trial judge
made several rulings. Among those rulings, the trial judge found
that: (1) the defendant's Mirandarights were given "in an unintelligible manner"; 29 (2) the defendant did not verbally acknowledge that
he understood his Fifth Amendment rights; and (3) the defendant's
"waiver of [these] rights was not given freely, intelligently, and
' ' The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision
voluntarily.""
to grant the defendant's motion to suppress the statement made
during this interrogation.''

2. Right to Counsel
In Cherrix v. Commonwealth,1 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia
determined that the defendant's confession was inadmissible
because his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated.'3 3 The
defendant claimed that the interrogation continued after he invoked
his right to counsel.'
The officer testified that he read the defen

126. Id.
127. 28 Va. App. 548, 507 S.E.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1998).
128. Id. at 554, 567 S.E.2d at 115-16.
129. Id. at 553, 507 S.E.2d at 115. The court of appeals stated that the only time the
officer's diction was unintelligible on the videotape was when he was reading the defendant
his Mirandarights. See id.
130. Id. at 552,507 S.E.2d at 114. The trial judge noted that the defendant wrote "yes" on
the waiver form only after the officer instructed him to do so if he could read and understand
English; however, the defendant was not instructed that he was waiving his Mirandarights
by signing the form. See id. at 554, 507 S.E.2d at 115.
131. See id. at 554-55, 507 S.E.2d at 116.
132. 257 Va. 292, 513 S.E.2d 642(1999).
133. See id. at 300-01, 513 S.E.2d at 648.
134. See id. at 300, 513 S.E.2d at 648. The defendant did "not explicitly argue that the
admission of his confession violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id. at 301 n.2,
513 S.E.2d at 648 n.2. The supreme court agreed with the Commonwealth that "the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is charge-specific and does not 'travel with a defendant and
attach [itself] to any other crimes." Id. (alteration in original). The facts at trial indicated
that the defendant was questioned on three separate occasions. See id. at 300-01, 513 S.E.2d
at 648. Specifically, on June 7, 1996, the defendant signed a written waiver of his Miranda
rights, and on April 16, 1997, the defendant elected to speak with the officer. See id. at 300,
513 S.E.2d at 648. On April 25, 1997, the officer again spoke to the defendant at Accomack
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dant his Mirandarights on three occasions, and that the defendant
did not ask for counsel at any time. 135 The supreme court held that
although the defendant testified to the contrary, the trial court has
the discretion to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and its
decision to accept the officer's
testimony over the defendant's was
136
supported by the record.

In McDaniel v. Commonwealth,'37 a panel of the Virginia Court
of Appeals held that the defendant had unambiguously invoked his
right to counsel by stating, after the administration of Miranda
warnings, "I think I would rather have an attorney here to speak for
me." 38 In this case, the officer testified that he arrested the
defendant for statutory burglary, grand larceny, and receiving stolen
property, and that he read the defendant his Mirandarights upon
his arrest. After transporting the defendant to police headquarters,
the officer started to interrogate him. The defendant's first response
to the interrogation was "I think I would rather have an attorney
here to speak for me."' 39 The officer continued the interrogation and
the defendant eventually confessed to committing the crimes. The
defendant testified that he requested an attorney when the interrogation began. 40 "[T]he trial judge ruled that the [defendant's]
request for counsel was ambiguous," and the confession was
admissible because he used the word "rather."'4 ' However, in a
panel decision, the court of appeals held that the defendant
"unambiguously responded with sufficient clarity that a reasonable
police officer would have understood that [the defendant] wanted an
attorney."'42 The court reversed the trial court's denial 4 3of the
suppression motion and remanded the case for a new trial.

County jail pursuant to the defendant's request. See id.
135. See id. at 300-01, 513 S.E.2d at 649.
136. See id. at 301-02, 513 S.E.2d at 648-49.
137. 28 Va. App. 432, 506 S.E.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1998). On December 15, 1998, the court of
appeals granted a rehearing en banc. See McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 660, 507.
S.E.2d 672 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
138. See McDaniel,28 Va. App. at 436-37, 506 S.E.2d at 23-24.
139. Id. at 433, 506 S.E.2d at 22.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 434, 506 S.E.2d at 22.
142. Id. at 435, 506 S.E.2d at 24.
143. See id. at 437, 506 S.E.2d at 24.
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3. Double Jeopardy'
The issue before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Phillips v.
Commonwealth,45 was whether the defendant's felony charges,
which were based on the same acts as his misdemeanor convictions,
146
were the subject of a simultaneous or a successive prosecution.
The defendant was charged with felony charges of selling
marijuana on school grounds and misdemeanor charges of distributing marijuana based on the same acts. On October 29, 1996, the
defendant was "convicted on the misdemeanor charges and waived
a preliminary hearing on the.., felony charges." 4 v The circuit court
denied the defendant's motion to quash the indictments, ruling that
the defendant "had not been subjected to successive prosecutions."'48
After his conditional guilty plea, the defendant was sentenced on the
felony offenses.
In a panel opinion, the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the
felony convictions and held that when felony and misdemeanor
charges are heard in a single evidentiary hearing, even though the
warrants were obtained on different dates, they are part of a single
prosecution.'49 The court of appeals denied the defendant's petition
for a rehearing en banc. 5 ° The supreme court focused its attention
on the second issue asserted by the defendant, which was whether
the decision in Slater v. Commonwealth15' barred the felony
prosecution because the charges were instituted on different dates

144. See discussion ofPayne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216,509 S.E.2d 293 (1999), infra
Part II.C, for a discussion of double jeopardy principles in the context of a capital case.
145. 257 Va. 548, 514 S.E.2d 340 (1999).
146. See id. at 549-50, 514 S.E.2d at 341.
147. Id. at 550, 514 S.E.2d at 341.
148. Id.
149. See id. (citingPhillips v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 674,680-81,500 S.E.2d 848,851
(Ct. App. 1998)). The court of appeals used Virginia Code section 19.2-294 in reaching this
conclusion. However, the Supreme Court ofVirginia held that the defendant failed to raise
at trial the issue of whether or not his misdemeanor convictions barred the felony
prosecutions at trial, under Virginia Code section 19.2-294. See Phillips,257 Va. at 551, 514
S.E.2d at 342.
150. See Phillips,257 Va. at 550, 514 S.E.2d at 341.
151. 15 Va. App. 593, 425 S.E.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1993). In Slater, the Virginia Court of
Appeals found that when criminal charges are instituted determines whether multiple
charges based on the same act are simultaneous or successive. See id at 596, 425 S.E.2d at
817. The court of appeals concluded that being charged with a felony offense and a
misdemeanor offense, based on the same act, and being tried and convicted on the
misdemeanor offense at the same time as the preliminary hearing on the felony offense did
not subject the defendant to successive prosecution. See id. In Phillips,the Supreme Court
of Virginia found "that the court of appeals properly limited its holding in Slater to the
particular facts [of] that case." Phillips,257 Va. at 553, 514 S.E.2d at 343.
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and were not part of a single prosecution. 152 The supreme court
affirmed the court of appeals, finding that "when 'felony and
misdemeanor charges are instituted at separate times, [based on the
same acts,] but are heard simultaneously in a single proceeding,
they are part of a single prosecution. " 15 3 Therefore, the defendant
had not been subjected to improper successive prosecutions in
violation of Virginia Code section 19.2-294.114
4. MirandaRights
In Timbers v. Commonwealth,"' a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions.5 6 The court held that
a booking officer's interrogation of the defendant in her holding cell
regarding the defendant's true identity violated the defendant's
Miranda rights.'5 7
C. EighthAmendment-Death Penalty
During the time period covered in this article, the Supreme Court
of Virginia upheld death sentences in eight of nine capital murder
cases. 5 8 Throughout these cases, the court refused to address

152. See Phillips,257 Va. at 552-53, 514 S.E.2d at 342.
153. Id. at 552, 514 S.E.2d at 343.
154. See id. at 553, 514 S.E.2d at 343. See generallyVA. CODE.ANN. § 19.2-294.1 (Repl. Vol.
1995 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
155. 28 Va. App. 187, 503 S.E.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1998).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 197, 201-02, 503 S.E.2d at 237, 240.
158. See Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 515 S.E.2d 565 (1999) (holding that the
murder of two individuals within three-year period and future dangerousness and vileness
justified the death sentence); Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 513 S.E.2d 642 (1999)
(holding that murder in course of forcible sodomy and future dangerousness and vileness
justified the death sentence); Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400
(1999) (holding that a murder committed as part of the same transaction as three other
murders and future dangerousness justified the death sentence); Hedrick v. Commonwealth,
257 Va. 328, 513 S.E.2d 634 (1999) (holding that murder in the commission of robbery and
future dangerousness and vileness justified the death sentence); Atkins v. Commonwealth,
257 Va. 160, 510 S.E.2d 445 (1999) (reversing the trial court and holding that murder in the
commission of robbery and future dangerousness and vileness did not justify the death
sentence); Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216,509 S.E.2d 293 (1999) (holding that murder
in the commission of robbery, murder in the commission of rape, murder in the commission
of or subsequent to object sexual penetration, murder in the commission of or subsequent to
attempted rape, and future dangerousness and vileness justified the death sentence); Kasi
v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407,508 S.E.2d 57 (1998) (holding that murder committed as part
of the same act as an additional murder and vileness justified death sentence); Reid v.
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561,506 S.E.2d 787 (1998) (holding that murder in the commission
of attempted rape and/or attempted robbery and vileness justified death sentence); Swisher
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certain issues that it had decided previously. These issues include
the following: (1) a trial court is not required to permit a defendant
to mail a questionnaire to potential jurors;'59 (2) a defendant has no
right to additional peremptory challenges in a capital murder
trial; 60 (3) a trial court has the discretion to require the Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars;' 6 ' (4) the aggravating factors that
the jury may consider to impose the death sentence are not unconstitutionally vague;112 and (5) the failure to provide the jury instructions clarifying these terms is not unconstitutional. 6 3 The cases
related to the law governing capital punishment are summarized
below.
In Atkins v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the defendant's conviction, but reversed the death sentence
and remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. 65 The court
found that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed
to ensure that the jury received a proper verdict form. 66 The verdict
form given to the jury failed to provide the option of sentencing the
defendant to life imprisonment upon a finding that neither of the
aggravating factors was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 16' The
court found that even though the defense counsel did not make a
precise objection to the Commonwealth's verdict form (which was
erroneous), it was sufficient that the defense counsel stated his
preference for his verdict form (which provided the missing
option). 16 On remand for a new sentencing proceeding, the supreme
court stated that the Commonwealth would be permitted to
introduce evidence that is relevant to prove either aggravating
factor. 169

v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 506 S.E.2d 763 (1998) (holding that murder in the

commission of abduction with intent to defile, murder in the commission ofor subsequent to
rape or forcible sodomy, and future dangerousness and vileness justified the death sentence).
159. See Cherrix,257 Va. at 299,513 S.E.2d at 647-48; Hedrick, 257 Va. at 328,513 S.E.2d
at 639; Swisher, 256 Va. at 478-79, 506 S.E.2d at 767.
160. See Atkins, 257 Va. at 172-73, 510 S.E.2d at 453-54; Swisher, 256 Va. at 478-79, 506
S.E.2d at 767.
161. See Walker, 258 Va. at 62-63, 515 S.E.2d at 570; Hedrick, 257 Va. at 337,513 S.E.2d
at 639; Swisher, 256 Va. at 479-80, 506 S.E.2d at 768.
162. See Walker, 258 Va. at 61, 515 S.E.2d at 569; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 S.E.2d at
647; Bramblett, 257 Va. at 263, 513 S.E.2d at 404; Atkins, 257 Va. at 172, 510 S.E.2d at 453.
163. See Walker, 258 Va. at 61, 515 S.E.2d at 569; Bramblett, 259 Va. at 268, 513 S.E.2d
at 404.
164. 257 Va. 160, 510 S.E.2d 445 (1999).
165. See id. at 179-80, 510 S.E.2d at 457.
166. See id. at 177, 510 S.E.2d at 456.
167. See id. at 176-77, 510 S.E.2d at 456.
168. See id. at 177 n.8, 510 S.E.2d at 456 n.8.
169. See id. at 178, 510 S.E.2d at 457.
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In Walker v. Commonwealth,171 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the death penalty of the defendant who broke into each
victims' apartment and shot each victim multiple times in front of
the victims' family members. 17' This is the first capital murder case
relying exclusively on Virginia Code section 18.2-31(8). 172 The court
found that the death penalty was not disproportionate for the
defendant who had a substantial criminal history, a history of
violent actions, and had committed
two unprovoked, brutal murders
17 3
within a six month period.

In Bramblett v. Commonwealth,74 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the death penalty of a defendant, as well as his three firstdegree murder convictions, three counts of using a firearm in the
commission of a murder, and arson. 175 The court held that testimony
concerning acts that occurred in the late 1970s was admissible in the
penalty phase on the issue of future dangerousness, and that the
time gap only affected the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 17 The court found that the death penalty was not disproportionate or excessive in this case where the defendant
had a criminal
177
history and had murdered young children.
In Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 78 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the death penalty for a defendant who committed murder
during the commission of a robbery. 179 The court upheld the trial
court's exercise of discretion in admitting enlarged photographs of
the victim's injuries. 18 0 Further, the court found that the death
penalty was not disproportionate for the defendant who had prior
convictions for armed robbery and who had committed an aggravated battery upon the victim.'' The court rejected the defendant's
contention that an aggravated battery is not committed when the
victim dies instantaneously from a single gunshot wound.'82
Instead, the court found that an aggravated battery occurred
170. 258 Va. 54, 515 S.E.2d 565 (1999).
171. See id. at 74, 515 S.E.2d at 576.
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(8) (Cum. Supp. 1999). This section deals with "[tihe willful,

deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-year period." Id.
173. See Walker, 258 Va. at 72-74, 515 S.E.2d at 576-77.
174. 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400 (1999).
175. See id. at 279, 513 S.E.2d at 410.
176. See id. at 278, 513 S.E.2d at 410.
177. See id. at 278-79, 513 S.E.2d at 410.
178. 257 Va. 328, 513 S.E.2d 634 (1999).
179. See id. at 343, 513 S.E.2d at 642.
180. See id. at 337-38, 513 S.E.2d at 639.
181. See id. at 338-39, 513 S.E.2d at 639-40.
182. See id. at 338, 513 S.E.2d at 640.

1999]

CRIMINAL LAW

because the defendant shot the victim in the face at close range after
robbing her, raping her, forcing her to commit sodomy, abducting
her, and holding her for approximately five hours, binding her hands
and covering her eyes and mouth." 3
In Cherrix v. Commonwealth,'" the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the death penalty of the defendant.'85 The court found that
the death penalty was not disproportionate for the defendant who
had a lengthy criminal history, including a history of violent
offenses, and lured the victim to a strange area, forcibly sodomized
her, and shot her in the head as she begged for her life.8 6 The court
also affirmed the trial court's decision that "'what a person may
expect [from] the penal system' is not relevant mitigation
evidence."' 87
In Paynev. Commonwealth,188 on mandatory review, the Supreme
Court of Virginia addressed for the first time whether a court can
impose more than one death sentence for the murder of one victim.'1 9
The defendant, who murdered two people, was sentenced to death on
four capital murder convictions.' 90 The defendant was found guilty
of murder in the commission of robbery and murder in the commission of rape of one victim, and guilty of murder in the commission of
object sexual penetration and murder in the commission of attempted rape for the second victim.' 9' There was a strong dissent by
Justice Koontz that could allow for future arguments on this issue.'92
In Payne, the supreme court looked to the test announced in
Blockburger v. United States,93 and analyzed the Virginia capital
murder statute.' 94 The court found that each offense required proof
of different facts and therefore, constituted more than one capital
offense.' 95 The supreme court held that the General Assembly
intended each distinct offense to be punished separately, which
allows for the imposition of more than one death sentence per victim,

183. See id. at 339, 513 S.E.2d at 640.
184. 257 Va. 292, 513 S.E.2d 642 (1999).
185. See id. at 314, 513 S.E.2d at 656.
186. See id. at 312-14, 513 S.E.2d at 655.
187. Id. at 310, 513 S.E.2d at 653.
188. 257 Va. 216, 509 S.E.2d 293 (1999).
189. See id. at 229, 509 S.E.2d at 301.
190. See id.
191. See id.at 221, 224, 509 S.E.2d at 296, 298.
192. See id. at 229, 509 S.E.2d at 301 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
193. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
194. See Payne, 257 Va. at 228,509 S.E.2d at 300-01 (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31
(Cur.Supp. 1999)).
195. See id. at 228, 509 S.E.2d at 301.
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and does not
violate the Fifth Amendment protection against double
196

jeopardy.

In Swisher v. Commonwealth,'9 the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the trial court's rejection ofjury instructions that would have
allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather
than capital or first degree murder based on his voluntary intoxication. 9 " The court approved this rejection because the proffered jury
instructions contained incorrect statements of the law and would
have allowed for a result that was contrary to common law.' 99 The
court reiterated that although voluntary intoxication may negate the
specific intent necessary to prove capital or first degree murder, it
is not admissible to reduce the offense to manslaughter.0 0
In Reid v. Commonwealth,2° ' the Supreme Court of Virginia
reiterated that the test for vileness does not require that the
defendant's mental state embrace the intent to commit a vile crime,
but only requires consideration of the number or the nature of the
batteries inflicted on the victim. 20 2 The court also restated that a

trial court must consider mitigating evidence in determining the
appropriate sentence, but is not required to give the evidence
controlling effect.20 3

196.
197.
198.
199.

See id. at 229, 509 S.E.2d at 301.
256 Va. 471, 506 S.E.2d 763 (1998).
See id. at 488, 506 S.E.2d at 772.
See id. The jury instructions proffered by the defendant were as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. R-1
Ifyou find that the defendant was so greatly intoxicated by the voluntary use of

alcohol and drugs that he was incapable of deliberating or premeditating, then
you cannot find him guilty of capital murder or murder in the first degree.

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to second degree murder or manslaughter.
INSTRUCTION NO. Q
You have been instructed on more than one grade of homicide and if you have a
reasonable doubt as to the grade of the offense, then you must resolve that doubt
in favor of the defendant, and find him guilty of the lesser offense. For example,
if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty of capital murder or first
degree murder, you shall find him guilty of first degree murder. If you have a
reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty of first degree murder or second
degree murder, you shall find him guilty of second degree murder or of voluntary
manslaughter. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty at all,
you shall find him not guilty.
Id.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id.
256 Va. 561, 506 S.E.2d 787 (1998).
See id. at 570, 506 S.E.2d at 793.
See id. at 569, 506 S.E.2d at 792.
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InKasi v. Commonwealth," 4 discussed earlier in this article, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that the defendant was not entitled
to contact a juror in order to question the juror about jury deliberations. 0 5 Specifically, the court found that the alleged misconduct
occurred inside the jury room and after the verdict during the guilt
phase, but prior to the jury's being sequestered, and therefore did
not rise to a level that warranted investigation.0 6
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A. Discovery
In Hanson v. Commonwealth," ' a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that the defendant's previous statements to Maryland
authorities concerning an unrelated shooting incident were not
"relevant" in his murder trial within the meaning of Rule 3A:1 of the
Supreme Court of Virginia."' However, the court found that the
defendant's direct examination testimony about the earlier shooting
incident was relevant to his defense that he suffered from an
"intermittent explosive disorder," and it opened the door to explore
made about this earlier incident on cross examinathe statements
9
tion.

20

B. Plea Agreements-Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C)(2)
In Commonwealth v. Sandy,210 the Supreme Court of Virginia
determined whether a defendant can enforce the terms of a plea
agreement that he executed with the Commonwealth's Attorney.211

204. 256 Va. 407, 508 S.E.2d 57(1998).
205. See id. at 424-25, 508 S.E.2d at 66-67.
206. See id.
207. 29 Va. App. 69, 509 S.E.2d 543 (Ct. App. 1999).
208. See id. at 78,509 S.E.2d at 547. On direct examination the defendant testified about
a shooting incident in 1990, which led to his conviction for attempted murder. See id. at 74,
509 S.E.2dat545. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth's Attorney asked the defendant
about statements he had made to the Maryland authorities in regards to the 1990 shooting
incident. See id. at 75, 509 S.E.2d at 546. Specifically the Commonwealth asked the
defendant if he remembered saying, "he 'did not feel bad about shooting [his] victim,' that he
'wished the exit wound could be even bigger,' and that he wished he had his nine millimeter
so his target 'would have dropped to the ground.- Id. (alteration in original). See generally
VA. Sup. CT. R. 3Al.

209. See id. at 80-81, 509 S.E.2d at 548-49.
210. 257 Va. 87, 509 S.E.2d 492(1999).
211. See id. at 88, 509 S.E.2d at 492.
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The defendant was indicted for thirty-two counts of intentionally
and fraudulently issuing grain receipts. After several plea negotiations, the defendant, the Commonwealth's Attorney, and a representative of the Virginia Department of Agriculture executed and signed
an agreement. The agreement provided that the defendant would
receive full transactional immunity from all acts related to the
information he provided to the Commonwealth's Attorney.212
Specifically, the agreement contained the following provisions:
3. That if... [the Commonwealth's Attorney] is reasonably satisfied that the
information provided by [the defendant] is full and complete, [the
Commonwealth's Attorney] will move the Court to amend seven of the
indictments.. . to petty larceny and that she will move the Court to nol pros
or dismiss all of the other indictments.
4. That [the Commonwealth's Attorney] will recommend to the Court that
[the defendant] be fined Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) on each of the no
more than seven (7) misdemeanor charges for which he is convicted, and be
sentenced to six (6) months in jail on each such charge, to run concurrently,
213
all suspended on the condition that the fines be paid.

After signing the agreement, the defendant met with the Commonwealth's Attorney and provided her with information regarding other
criminal offenses. Several days later, in a letter to defense counsel,
the Commonwealth's Attorney informed the defendant that she
would not honor the agreement because she had verified that the
defendant lied to her. The defendant filed a petition in the circuit
court and requested the court to enforce the agreement. After
conducting an ore tenus hearing, the trial court held that there was
no enforceable agreement between the defendant and the Commonwealth.214 The defendant was then tried and convicted of seven
counts of fraudulently and intentionally issuing grain receipts.2 15
Reversing the convictions, a panel of the court of appeals held a
contractual relationship existed between the defendant and the
Commonwealth that could not be unilaterally withdrawn.1 6 Upon a
rehearing en banc, the court of appeals affirmed the panel decision
and ordered specific performance of the agreement.1 7

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
banc).

See id.
Id. at 89, 509 S.E.2d at 492-93.
See id. at 89-90, 509 S.E.2d at 493.
See id.
See Sandy v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 1, 486 S.E.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1997).
See Sandy v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 724, 496 S.E.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1998) (en
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The supreme court reversed the court of appeals by holding that
a Commonwealth's Attorney may withdraw from a proposed
agreement any time before the actual entry of the defendant's guilty
plea or before the defendant changes his position in reliance on the
agreement resulting in prejudice to him.2 1 This decision was based
in part on Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C)(2),21 9 which governs plea agreements in
criminal proceedings. The court held that this rule requires the
circuit court to approve the plea agreement, which did not occur in
this case.2 2 °
C. Right to PreliminaryHearing
In Armel v. Commonwealth,2 2 ' the Virginia Court of Appeals, in
a panel decision, held that the defendant was not deprived of his
right to a preliminary hearing when he was directly indicted and
tried for the same offenses that had been previously nol prossed in
general district court.22 2
On July 17, 1996, the defendant was arrested on charges of
uttering a check with the intent to defraud and possession of a
firearm after being convicted of a felony. When a Commonwealth
witness failed to appear at the defendant's preliminary hearing in
the general district court, the charges were nol prossed. On September 9, 1996, a grand jury directly indicted the defendant on the same
offenses. The trial court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to
a preliminary hearing because he was not "arrested on a charge of
felony" at the time of his indictment. 223 A panel of the court of
appeals found that after the charges in general district court were
nol prossed, the defendant was no longer arrested on a charge of
felony. 2 ' The defendant was then properly indicted 22on the same
offenses without the benefit of a preliminary hearing.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See Sandy, 257 Va. at 91, 509 S.E.2d at 494.
VA. Sup. Or. R. 3A:8(c)(1)(C)(2).
See Sandy, 257 Va. at 91, 509 S.E.2d at 493-94.
28 Va. App. 407, 505 S.E.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 411, 505 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 408-09, 505 S.E.2d at 379.
See id. at 410-11, 505 S.E.2d at 380.
See id.
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IV. JUVENILES

A. Commitment Review Hearing

In Richardsonv. Commonwealth,226 a panel of the Virginia Court
of Appeals held that ajuvenile and domestic relations court order in
a commitment review hearing is final and appealable.22 The
defendant in this case was committed to the Department of Juvenile
Justice on June 11, 1997. The juvenile court declined to rescind the
defendant's commitment in a commitment review hearing on August
7, 1997. The circuit court dismissed the defendant's August 18, 1997
appeal as untimely, holding that the June 11 commitment order, not
the August 7 order, was the appealable order.2" The court of
appeals reversed and held that an order determining whether to
modify, revoke, or continue a juvenile's commitment following a
review hearing is "a final, appealable order." 229 The court of appeals
remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the defendant's
appeal because the August 7 order was an appealable order." °
B. Sentencing
In Jackson v. Commonwealth,23 ' the Virginia Court of Appeals, in
a panel decision, held that a circuit court had the statutory authority
to impose a juvenile sentencing option as a condition of suspending
the execution of a prison sentence. 2 In this case, the circuit court
tried the defendant as an adult. He plead guilty to the charges of
petit larceny and statutory burglary. The trial judge sentenced the
defendant to ten years in prison for the statutory burglary charge to
be served concurrently with one year in prison for the petit larceny
charge. The court then suspended both sentences upon the conditions that the defendant be committed to the Department of Juvenile

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

28 Va. App. 389, 504 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 393, 504 S.E.2d at 886.
See id. at 390, 504 S.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 391-92, 504 S.E.2d at 885.
See id. at 393, 504 S.E.2d at 886.
29 Va. App. 418, 512 S.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1999).
See id. at 423-24, 512 S.E.2d at 841. The court found the statutory authority in

VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(A)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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Justice until he turned twenty-one, that he complete the "Serious
Offender Program," and that he be of good behavior for a period of
ten years.233
C. Transfers
In Commonwealth v. Baker,3 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the court of appeals's decision that the transfer of a
defendant's charge from a juvenile and domestic relations court to
a circuit court was ineffectual, and the subsequent convictions void,
because the juvenile's biological father did not receive notice that the
petition had been filed, in violation of Virginia Code section 16.1263(A)Y65 The supreme court held to apply this decision retrospectively.2
V. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Abduction: Principalin the Second Degree
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 7 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals decided an issue of first impression concerning the abduction of a child by its natural parent."' The court held that the
defendant, who aided her fianc6 in taking his child from the child's
mother, could not be convicted for abduction as a principal in the
second degree. 9 The facts at trial indicated that the defendant's
fianc6 had a child with another woman. The defendant's fianc6 was
never married to the other woman, and they had never lived
together. The defendant's fianc6 had never paid child support and no
custody order was pending or in effect. ° The court found that "ifno
custody proceedings are pending, the natural parent of a child may
not be convicted for abducting the child 'with the intent . . . to
withhold or conceal him from any person ... lawfully entitled to his

233. See Jackson, 29 Va. App. at 419-20, 512 S.E.2d at 839.
234. 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam).
235. See id at 2,516 S.E.2d at 220; see also VA- CODE ANN. § 16.1-263(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
As the court noted, this statute was amended effective July 1, 1999 to provide for notice to at
least one parent, rather than to both parents. See infraPart ]X.
236. See Baker, 258 Va. at 2,516 S.E.2d at 220.
237. 28 Va. App. 498, 507 S.E.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1998). On January 6, 1999, the court of
appeals granted a rehearing en banc. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 723, 508
S.E.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1999) (en bane).
238. See Taylor, 28 Va. App. at 509-10, 507 S.E.2d at 91-92.
239. See id. at 509-10, 507 S.E.2d at 94.

240. See id. at 501, 507 S.E.2d at 90.
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charge.'m241 The court of appeals further held that a person "who
aids [the] parent in taking the child also does not commit
abduction." 242
B. Aggravated Sexual Battery
In Castelow v. Commonwealth,2 43 the Virginia Court of Appeals,
in a panel decision, held that a child's statement to her stepmother
regarding alleged sexual molestation that had occurred sixteen
months earlier was inadmissible and its admission at trial required
reversal of the defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction. '
At trial, the victim testified that on October 27, 1995, she was
watching television with the defendant in the living room of her
mother's house when the defendant gave her beer to drink. The
victim further testified that by 2:00 a.m. she had consumed six beers
and was drunk. The victim testified that as she walked past the
defendant on her way to bed, he grabbed her and she fell to the floor.
The defendant then got on top of her, unbuttoned her blouse,
touched her breasts and the clothing around her vaginal area, and
then tried to kiss her. Sixteen months later, in February 1997, the
victim's stepmother questioned her about something she had written
in her diary. The victim's stepmother testified that the victim told
her about the incident with the defendant.24 5
After reviewing the case law concerning the definition of "recently
after the commission," the court of appeals held that, in the absence
of evidence explaining the sixteen month delay, the Commonwealth
failed to provide a foundation from which the trial judge could find
that the complaint met the statutory requirement of being made
"recently after [the] commission of the offense."2 46
C. Child Neglect and Cruelty to Children
In Ellis v. Commonwealth,247 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions for child neglect and
cruelty to children, finding that inattention and inadvertence cannot

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 507, 507 S.E.2d at 93 (alteration in original).
Id. at 510, 507 S.E.2d at 94.
29 Va. App. 305, 512 S.E.2d 137 (Ct. App. 1999).
See id. at 312-13, 512 S.E.2d at 139-40.
See id. at 308-09, 512 S.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 312, 512 S.E.2d at 139-40.
29 Va. App. 548, 513 S.E.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1999).
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be equated with actions taken willfully."4 The facts at trial indicated
that the defendant left her two young children, ages four and two,
napping in a closed bedroom in their first-floor apartment while she
visited a neighbor's house. Earlier that day, she lit her cigarette on
a gas burner and inadvertently left it on. The burner caused a fire
that injured the two young children.24 9 The court found there was no
evidence that the defendant left the apartment with the intent to
injure her children or that she knew that her children would be
injured as a likely result of her departure.-'
D. Escape
In Cavell v. Commonwealth,251 the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of escape
because the officer did not effectuate an arrest.' In this case, an
officer armed with "OC" spray approached a crowd and ordered them
to disperse. As the crowd dispersed, the officer saw the defendant,
who the officer knew had an outstanding felony warrant. The officer
approached the defendant and told him he needed to speak with
him. When the officer was within ten feet of the defendant he told
him he was under arrest. The defendant responded with profanity.
The officer then moved within four to five feet of the defendant and
again told him he was under arrest. Before the officer could get any
closer, the defendant ran." 3
After reviewing Virginia's law of arrest, the court of appeals
concluded that an arrest cannot be made without touching or
submission.254 The court found that the defendant did not submit to
the officer's showing of authority nor did the officer touch the
255
defendant, and therefore the officer did not effectuate an arrest.
Since the defendant was neither under arrest, nor in custody, he
could not be found guilty of escapeY

248. See id. at 557-58, 513 S.E.2d at 458.
249. See id. at 551-53, 513 S.E.2d at 455.
250. See id. at 555-58, 513 S.E.2d at 457-58.
251. 28 Va. App. 484, 506 S.E.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
252. See id. at 487, 506 S.E.2d at 553.
253. See id. at 485, 506 S.E.2d at 553.
254. See id. at 487, 506 S.E.2d at 553.
255. See id.
256. See id. In a related case, on an issue of first impression, a panel of the Virginia Court
of Appeals held that the underlying offense for which an accused is in custody is not an
essential element ofmisdemeanor escape underVirginia Code section 18.2-479. See Williams
v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 696, 700, 514 S.E.2d 381, 383 (Ct. App. 1999).
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E. Indecent Liberties with a Child
In Siquina v. Commonwealth,25 the defendant was watching
television in a bedroom with a friend's five-year-old daughter when
he placed his hand over the child's mouth, led her to a bathroom,
kissed the child, and forced his tongue in her mouth. The defendant
instructed the child to face the toilet with her back to him. When the
child's mother opened the bathroom door, she saw the defendant
standing "very close" behind the child with his pants and underwear
pulled down and his erect penis exposed but the child did not see his
genitals. The defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties
with a child and attempted rape."'
A panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to prove that the defendant took
indecent liberties with a child.259 The court found that an adult's
intentional display of his or her genitals in the presence of a child,
"where a reasonable probability exists that they might be seen by
that child, regardless of the child's actual perception of such a
display" satisfies the word "expose" as used in Virginia Code section
18.2-370.26 ° The court also held that the specific intent to commit
rape can be shown without any evidence that the defendant
touched
26 1
his victim's sexual organs or removed her clothing.
F. Involuntary Manslaughter
In Conradv. Commonwealth, 6 ' a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter, and found the evidence insufficient to support the
conviction. 3 In this case, the defendant fell asleep while driving and
drove off the road, striking and killing a jogger. The defendant
worked the day before the accident and had been awake all night.
The responding officer testified that the defendant said he caught
himself dozing off four or five times, but decided to continue driving

257. 28 Va. App. 694, 508 S.E.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1998).
258. See id. at 696-97, 508 S.E.2d at 351-52.
259. See id. at 697-98, 508 S.E.2d at 352.
260. Id. at 699, 508 S.E.2d at 353; see VA. CODE ANN. § j18.2-370 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum.
Supp. 1999).
261. See id. at 700-01, 508 S.E.2d at 353-54.
262. 29 Va. App. 661, 514 S.E.2d 364 (Ct. App. 1999), reh'g granted,30 Va. App. 94, 515
S.E.2d 780 (Ct. App. 1999).
263. See Conrad, 29 Va. App. at 664, 514 S.E.2d at 365.
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because he was only about five minutes from home.2" The court of
appeals held that the defendant's conduct did not support a finding
of criminal negligence." 5 The court could not conclude that the
defendant "knew or should have known that his conduct in proceeding the short distance to his nearby home 'probably would cause
injury to another' or that he acted mercilessly or inhumanely in

failing to stop."26 6 The court of appeals stated that the evidence 267
may

have only supported a finding of ordinary or gross negligence.
G. Object Sexual Penetration

In Jett v. Commonwealth,268 the Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's finding that the evidence was sufficient to
support a conviction for object sexual penetration. 269 The nine-yearold victim testified at trial that the defendant taught her to put a
hairbrush "on the outside of [her] pookie ...and rub it." 270 She also
testified that the defendant told her to do the same thing with her
Barbie doll, and that the defendant would use his finger or his
tongue to "rub [her] pookie back and forth."2 7 ' The victim's mother

testified that "the victim's vaginal area was often red, rashed, and
her 'clitoris would be very swollen."272 She also testified that the
victim would sit "in sitz baths.., because her pookie hurt.'"273 The

victim and her2 mother
sought medical attention because the problem
74

was so severe.

At trial, the defendant moved to strike the charges because the
Commonwealth failed to prove evidence of penetration of the labia
majora. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant was
convicted. 275 After a review of the case law concerning the issue of
penetration, the court held that "evidence of penetration or stimulation of the clitoris is sufficient to establish penetration of the labia
majora" which is part of the vulva.7 6 The court of appeals relied on

264. See id. at 665, 514 S.E.2d at 366. The defendant testified that he told the officer that
he had dozed off one or two times. See id. at 666-67, 514 S.E.2d at 366.
265. See id. at 669, 514 S.E.2d at 367-68.
266. Id. at 672, 514 S.E.2d at 369.
267. See id.
268. 29 Va. App. 190, 510 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 1999) (en banc).
269. See id. at 197, 510 S.E.2d at 750.
270. Id. at 193, 510 S.E.2d at 748.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 195, 510 S.E.2d at 749.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 193-95, 510 S.E.2d at 748-49.
276. Id. at 195, 510 S.E.2d at 749.
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a previous decision which held that "'[plenetration may be prove[n]
by circumstantial evidence and is not dependent on direct testimony," 27 7 and only slight penetration is necessary. 7 1 The court

found that the circumstantial evidence submitted through the
testimony of the victim and her mother sufficed to establish the
element of penetration. 9
The court of appeals distinguished this case from Moore v.
Commonwealth"' because the Commonwealth, in this case,
presented the testimony of the victim's mother concerning her
daughter's vaginal pain and required medical attention, in addition
to that of the victim's testimony.2 8 The court concluded that the
direct and indirect testimony of penetration is distinguishable from
Moore, and was sufficient to establish penetrationY 2
H. Obstruction of Justice
In Ruckman v. Commonwealth,"3 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that the defendant did not "obstruct" the trooper's
investigation of a single-vehicle accident by giving conflicting
statements as to whether he could remember who was driving.' On
October 20, 1996, a Virginia State Trooper responded to the scene of
a single-vehicle accident, where the defendant told the trooper that
the other man in the truck was driving. In April 1997, the defendant
again told the trooper that he was not driving the truck. However,
in June 1997, the defendant told the trooper that he could not
remember who was driving the truck.28 5
I. ObtainingPropertyby False Pretenses
In Lewis v. Commonwealth,286 a panel of the Virginia Court of

Appeals decided another issue of first impression. The court held

277. Id. at 194, 510 S.E.2d at 748.
278. See id. at 194, 510 S.E.2d at 749.
279. See id. at 196, 510 S.E.2d at 749.
280. 254 Va. 184, 191, 491 S.E.2d 739, 742-43 (1997) (holding that the victim's testimony
that the defendant put his penis "on" her vagina was insufficient to establish the essential
element of penetration).
281. See Jett, 29 Va. App. at 196-97, 510 S.E.2d at 749-50.
282. See id. at 197, 510 S.E.2d at 750.
283. 28 Va. App. 428, 505 S.E.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1998).
284. See id. at 431, 505 S.E.2d at 390.
285. See id. at 430, 505 S.E.2d at 389.
286. 28 Va. App. 164, 503 S.E.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1998).
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that evidence showing that the defendant took property under a
conditional sales contract and that the victim retained the legal title
to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price was sufficient to
support a conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses. 18 The
court, however, reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial
court failed to instruct the jury that the intent to defraud must exist
at the time the false representations are made.18
The facts at trial indicated that in March 1996 the defendant
negotiated for the purchase of a Sir Speedy printing franchise, but
the sale was never completed. On April 3, 1996, the defendant went
to Brown's Mazda to purchase a truck and presented himself as the
president and owner of a Sir Speedy printing franchise. The
defendant stated that the franchise was going to purchase the truck
for the company, and he would return in three days with the full
purchase price of the truck. The finance manager relied on the
defendant's representations and had him fill out the necessary
paperwork, including the title form and permanent registration
form. The defendant received a temporary certificate of ownership
and the keys to the truck. The dealership never received payment for
the truckY9 The court of appeals held that "the property interest
conveyed by both the delivery of possession to [the defendant] and
the completion of the temporary certificate of ownership in the
[defendant's] name was sufficient to support a conviction for larceny
by false pretenses."29
The court ofappeals reversed the defendant's conviction, however,
holding that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury
that: "Fraudulent intent must be proved by more than a mere
showing that [the defendant] knowingly provided a false statement
to Brown's Mazda. In addition, the fraudulent intent must have
existed at the time the false pretenses were made."29 '
In Bolden v. Commonwealth,29 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction of obtaining an automobile by false pretenses, finding that the defendant owned and
possessed the automobile at the time of the alleged fraud. 293 In this

case, the defendant received a loan from Toyota to purchase a 1996
Toyota RAV-4. The certificate of title listed the defendant as the
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See id. at 170, 503 S.E.2d at 225.
See id. at 172-73, 503 S.E.2d at 225-26.
See id. at 166-67, 503 S.E.2d at 223.
Id. at 170, 503 S.E.2d at 225.
Id. at 172, 503 S.E.2d at 225-26.
28 Va. App. 488, 507 S.E.2d 84 (Ct.'App. 1998).
See id. at 490, 507 S.E.2d at 85.
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owner and Toyota as the lienholder. Approximately five months
later, the Department of Motor Vehicles issued the defendant a
duplicate certificate of title based upon her application and the
information in a letter allegedly from Toyota stating that her lien
had been satisfied. 4
The indictment charged the defendant with obtaining a vehicle
from the lienholder by false pretenses. At trial, a Toyota employee
testified that the defendant had not made any payments on the loan,
and the defendant admitted to falsifying the letter in order to obtain
a lien-free duplicate certificate of title so that she could sell the
car.295 The court of appeals agreed with the defendant's argument on
appeal and held that at the time the defendant acquired the new
certificate of title, she was the legal owner of the vehicle, not
Toyota.296 The court stated that a lienholder's "physical possession
of the certificate of title [does] not give it ownership of the vehicle." 7
The court held that the defendant was in lawful possession of the
vehicle at the time she perpetrated the fraud on the Department of
Motor Vehicles; therefore, she could not be convicted of larceny by
false pretenses from the lienholder, Toyota.29
J. Possession of a Sawed-off Shotgun
In Dillardv. Commonwealth,299 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction for possession of a
sawed-off shotgun."' The court of appeals held that in order to meet
the statutory definition of "sawed-off shotgun," the Commonwealth
must prove that the shotgun was at least .225 caliber.30' The court
stated that the trial court erred in ruling that the language concerning the caliber of the gun constituted an affirmative defense, as that
ruling reversed the burden of proof.30 2 Although the court found that

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See id. at 490-91, 507 S.E.2d at 85.
See id. at 491, 507 S.E.2d at 85.
See id. at 492, 507 S.E.2d at 86.
Id. at 493, 507 S.E.2d at 86.
See id. at 494, 507 S.E.2d at 87.

299.
300.
301.
302.

28 Va. App. 340, 504 S.E.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 343-44, 504 S.E.2d at 412-13.
See id.
See id. at 346, 504 S.E.2d at 414.
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the evidence in this case sufficiently proved this element, it reversed
and remanded the case because the trial court did not consider the
sufficiency of the evidence to prove this element."' 3
K Voluntary Manslaughter
In Commonwealth v. Presley,"° the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant's acts
caused the victim's death and upheld the defendant's conviction for
voluntary manslaughter." 5 In this case, the victim died from a
subdural hematoma caused by an injury to her head that occurred
within several hours of her death. The defendant and the victim
were involved in a sexual relationship and shared a house with
another man. On the night in question, the defendant and the victim
had an argument over an affair the victim previously had. The
roommate heard arguing and banging coming from the victim's
upstairs bedroom.0 6 He also heard the victim say "[pilease don't hit
me" and the defendant call her a "fucking bitch."0 7 The roommate
went upstairs and saw the victim on the floor, and the defendant's
hands were around her throat."0 8 About forty-five minutes later, the
police responded to a call about an unconscious female. The victim
was found lying on her floor with multiple bruises and very labored
breathing. She died approximately three hours later. The defendant
told the officers that he "tore [the victim] to shreds," that he "beat
the hell out of her on the floor," and that he "hit her with a chair.""'
VI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

A. Defense of PersonalProperty
In Alexander v. Commonwealth,1 ' a panel of the Virginia Court
ofAppeals held that the trial court committed reversible error when
it failed to instruct the jury on the law of defense of personal
303. See id. at 343-44, 504 S.E.2d at 412-13. The court of appeals held that the
Commonwealth proved this element by proving that the defendant possessed a twelve gauge
shotgun because a 12-gauge shotgun has a caliber greater than .225. See id. at 348, 504
S.E.2d at 415.
304. 256 Va. 465, 507 S.E.2d 72 (1998).
305. See id. at 470, 507 S.E.2d at 74.
306. See id. at 467, 469, 507 S.E.2d at 72-74.
307. Id. at 467, 507 S.E.2d at 73.
308. See id. at 468-69, 507 S.E.2d at 73-74.
309. Id. at 468, 507 S.E.2d at 73.
310. 28 Va. App. 771, 508 S.E.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1999), affd on reh'g, 30 Va. App. 152, 515
S.E.2d 808 (Ct. App. 1999) (en banc).
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property. 1 ' The facts at trial indicated that a repo man arrived at
the defendant's home to repossess the defendant's car. The repo man
agreed to allow the defendant to remove his personal property from
the car. While the defendant was partially inside the car, the repo
man jacked the car up and demanded the keys, at which point the
defendant went into the house and returned with the keys. The
defendant also brought an unloaded rifle with him and placed it in
the flowerbed."' The defendant testified that when the repo man
approached him in a "belligerent manner," he feared for his personal
safety and the safety of his property.1 13 The defendant retrieved the
rifle from the flowerbed and held it at his side. After "believ[ing] that
[the repo man] was intent upon assaulting him," the defendant
raised his rifle and pointed it at the repo man. 3 4 The defendant was
charged with and convicted of brandishing a firearm.3 15
A panel of the court of appeals found that because the defendant
agreed to the repossession of his car only if he was first allowed to
remove his personal property, the repo man was required to either
allow the defendant to remove his personal property or to desist and
resort to appropriate legal remedies." 6 The court held that because
"[the repo man's] attempt to dispossess [the defendant] of his
property was 'without right,' [the defendant] was privileged to use
reasonable force in defense of his personal property." 7 Finally, the
court held that because there was a factual dispute as to whether
the amount of force was reasonable, the trial court was required to
instruct the jury on the law of defense of personal property.1
B. Lesser-included Offense
In Dalton v. Commonwealth,1 9 the Virginia Court of Appeals, en
banc, addressed an issue of first impression: whether a defendant

311. See Alexander, 28 Va. App. at 779, 508 S.E.2d at 916.
312. See id. at 774, 508 S.E.2d at 913.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 775, 508 S.E.2d at 913.
315. See id. at 774, 508 S.E.2d at 913.
316. See id. at 776, 508 S.E.2d at 914.
317. Id.
318. See id. at 779, 508 S.E.2d at 916. Judge Bumgardner filed a dissenting opinion in this
case. See id. at 779-80, 508 S.E.2d at 916 (Bungardner, J., dissenting).
319. 29 Va. App. 316, 512 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1999) (en banc).
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who has not been charged as an accessory after the fact is entitled
to a jury instruction on the offense of being an accessory after the
fact when this instruction is supported by the evidence. 20
The defendant appealed his conviction for first degree murder and
argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on
the crime of accessory after the fact to murder. The court of appeals
reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence warranted an
instruction on the crime of accessory after the fact to murder, and
that the defendant was entitled to such an instruction even though
the defendant
was not originally charged with accessory after the
3 21
fact.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Lemons stated that the majority's
holding is contrary to common law, as it allows for the crime of
accessory after the fact to be considered as if it were a lesserincluded offense of murder.322 The dissent concluded that the
"conviction for a crime which has neither been charged in the
indictment, nor is a lesser-included offense of the named charge,
would require an accused to defend a different offense from that
which he or she is charged."323
VII. EVIDENCE
A. Expert Testimony
In Hussen v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia
determined whether an expert witness's testimony on the issue of
consent impermissibly invades the province of the jury." In this
case, the defendant was charged with rape and forcible sodomy.
Over the defendant's objection, a sexual assault nurse qualified as
an expert witness and testified that a one-half centimeter laceration
just below the victim's vaginal opening was inconsistent with a
woman having consensual sex for the first time. 26

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

See id. at 323, 512 S.E.2d at 145.
See id at 327-28, 512 S.E.2d at 147-48.
See id. at 334, 512 S.E.2d at 150 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
Id. at 338, 512 S.E.2d at 153 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
257 Va. 93, 511 S.E.2d 106 (1999).
See id. at 94, 511 S.E.2d at 106.
See id. at 96-98, 511 S.E.2d at 107-08.
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On appeal,3 27 the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
allowing the expert to testify on the issue of consent because it was
an ultimate issue of fact.328 The supreme court concluded that the
expert did not express an opinion on the ultimate issue of consent,
but only expressed an opinion as to the nature and location of the
victim's injury in relation to consensual, first-time intercourse.3 29
Playing a game of semantics, the dissent opined that the expert's
testimony was really an expression of her expert opinion on whether
the injury was the result of a sexual assault.330
In Currie v. Commonwealth,3 ' a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals upheld the defendant's convictions for burglary, attempted
rape, and assault and battery, holding that (1) expert testimony
regarding the reliability of the victim's identification of the defendant
was inadmissible; 33 2 (2) composite drawing and police records of
other sexual assaults in the area were not exculpatory;3 33 and (3) the
preliminary hearing transcript was not admissible to impeach the
victim's testimony. 3 4
In this case, the victim was in the bathroom of her apartment
when she heard a noise in the living room. She headed toward the
noise, and saw a man with his pants down and his penis exposed.
The man grabbed the victim's breast, and she kicked him. After
producing a knife, the man grabbed the victim's pants and began to
pull them down. The victim then pushed the man and ran to her
bedroom to call the police. The victim described the man to the police
including his missing upper tooth, a rash on his neck, and various
marks on his arms. A few days after the incident, the victim
identified the defendant in a photographic lineup. The victim again
identified the defendant at trial. The trial court allowed an expert on
eyewitness identification to testify regarding the theory of memory
in the field of psychology and the problems of cross-racial identifica-

327. When the court of appeals denied the defendant's petition for appeal, he filed a habeas
corpus petition. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the defendant was entitled to

pursue a delayed appeal because his counsel failed to seek an appeal from the judgment of
the court of appeals. See id. at 94, 511 S.E.2d at 106.
328. See id. at 98, 511 S.E.2d at 108.
329. See id. at 99, 511 S.E.2d at 109.
330. See id. at 100, 511 S.E.2d at 110 (Poff, J., dissenting).
331. 30 Va. App. 58, 515 S.E.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1999).
332. See id. at 66, 515 S.E.2d at 339.
333. See id. at 69, 515 S.E.2d at 340.
334. See id. at 73, 515 S.E.2d at 342.
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tions. The trial court excluded the expert's testimony on five other
topics.33 5
The court of appeals held that the admissibility of expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification is left to the discretion of
the trial court.3 6 The court held that the trial court did not err in
excluding the expert's testimony on issues concerning the correlation
between eyewitness certainty and accuracy. 3 The court stated that
the jury was capable of evaluating the reliability of the victim's
identification based on the suggested problems with memory.3 8 The
court also found that the sealed composite drawing provided "no
favorable information to the accused, and its exclusion did not
deprive him of a fair trial."339 Because the defendant could not
specifically identify the ways in which the police reports were
exculpatory, "the trial court did not err in declining to provide the
requested materials to the defendant.""' 4 Finally, the court of appeals
held that "the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the
preliminary hearing transcript."3 4 ' The court stated that because the
victim acknowledged her preliminary hearing testimony, the
defendant was precluded from introducing extrinsic evidence to
impeach the victim.3 42
B. FingerprintCards to Prove Identity
In Crawley v. Commonwealth,3 43 the Virginia Court of Appeals, in
a panel decision, held that fingerprint cards were insufficient to
prove the defendant's identity in a breaking and entering prosecution.3 " The court of appeals held that "although the... fingerprint
cards bore the same first and last names and identical birth dates,
no evidence in the record proved [the defendant's] name or birth

335. See id. at 62-63, 515 S.E.2d at 337-38. The expert was not allowed to testify on the
following five topics:
(1)the correlation between eyewitness certainty and accuracy; (2) the effect of
viewing time and stress on eyewitness accuracy; (3) the perpetrator's display of
a weapon and its effect on eyewitness accuracy; (4) the effect that participating
in preparing a composite sketch of a subject has on the accuracy of subsequent
identifications; and (5) the concept of transference.
Id. at 63, 515 S.E.2d at 337-38.
336. See id. at 65, 515 S.E.2d at 338.
337. See id. at 65, 515 S.E.2d at 339.
338. See id. at 66, 515 S.E.2d at 339.
339. Id. at 68, 515 S.E.2d at 340.
340. Id. at 69, 515 S.E.2d at 340.
341. Id. at 73, 515 S.E.2d at 342.
342. See id. at 72-73, 515 S.E.2d at 342.
343. 29 Va. App. 372, 512 S.E.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1999).
344. See id. at 379-80, 512 S.E.2d at 173.
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date." 45 The court stated that "the only evidence admitted at trial
that linked [the defendant] to the break-in was that his gender, race
and height were the same as those of both the perpetrator, as proved
by the fingerprint cards, and the person observed fleeing the scene
of the crime."3 46 This evidence was insufficient "to exclude all

reasonable hypotheses of innocence and, therefore, did not prove
beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was inside the victim's
34 7
apartment."

C. Gang-RelatedEvidence
In Utz v. Commonwealth,348 another case of first impression this
year, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that an expert can testify
about the culture of street gangs.3 49 A unanimous panel of the court
held that a detective with extensive experience and knowledge of
gangs was qualified to give expert testimony concerning gang-related
evidence. 5 The court also held that evidence concerning the culture
of street gangs and evidence that the defendant and the victim were
members of different gangs was admissible in the defendant's trial
for second degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of
that murder.3
Several witnesses testified that the victim was outside an
apartment complex when he heard someone yelling. The victim
headed towards a parking lot while exchanging insults with the
defendant. Once the victim reached the parking lot, he "raised his
hands as if he was going to fight."5 ' The defendant then turned and
at close range shot the victim once in the head. None of the witnesses
saw a gun or other weapon in the victim's hands. The defendant
testified that he shot the victim in self-defense. During a motion in
limine, the trial court ruled that expert testimony from a detective
pertaining to the defendant's and the victim's gang affiliations was
admissible to rebut the defendant's self-defense claim and to show
that the defendant had another motive for shooting the victim. The
detective testified that the defendant had likely come onto the "turf'

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. at 378, 512 S.E.2d at 172.
Id.
Id. at 379-80, 512 S.E.2d at 173.
28 Va. App. 411, 505 S.E.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 418, 505 S.E.2d at 383-84.
See id. at 426, 505 S.E.2d at 387.
See id.
Id. at 416, 505 S.E.2d at 382.
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of the victim's gang and that a concealed hand could mean the victim
was armed with a weapon. 3
A panel of the court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling and
found that gang-related evidence is admissible "if it is sufficiently
relevant to a proper issue in the case, weighing this probative value
against the danger of unfair prejudice."354 The court held that "the
gang-related evidence was relevant to establish a motive for the
murder and was probative of [the defendant's] intent."355 The court
also pointed out that the detective in this case had many hours of
gang-related training, many years of experience as a law enforceand familiarity with both the defendant's and the
ment officer, 356
victim's gang.

D. Hearsay Exceptions
In Robinson v. Commonwealth,357 the Supreme Court of Virginia
faced a two-part issue of first impression concerning the value of
items contained on price tags.358 The question presented was whether
the amount on a retailer's price tag, or if the price tag is not offered
into evidence, a witness's testimony concerning the amount he
observed on the tag, constitutes inadmissible hearsay when offered
to prove the value of the item involved in a theft. 359 The supreme
court found that evidence of this type is hearsay and does not fall
into any of the currently accepted exceptions to the hearsay rule. 60
However, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, the supreme
court created a new exception to the.hearsay rule and held that in
shoplifting cases, evidence of price tags regularly affixed to items or
testimony concerning the amounts shown on such tags would be
sufficient to prove an item's value. 6 '
The dissent stated that in creating the new exception to the
hearsay rule, the majority shifted the burden of proving the value of
the taken merchandise from the Commonwealth to the defendant.6 2
The dissent also stated that the new exception is not necessary
353. See id. at 416-18, 426, 505 S.E.2d at 382-84, 387.
354. Id. at 421,505 S.E.2d at 385 (citing John E. Theuman, Annotation, Admissibility of
Accused's Membership in Gang, 39 A.L.R. 4th 775 (1985)).
355. Id. at 423, 505 S.E.2d at 386.
356. See id. at 425-26, 505 S.E.2d at 387.
357. 258 Va. 3, 516 S.E.2d 475 (1999).
358. See id. at 7, 516 S.E.2d at 477.
359. See id.
360. See id. at 9, 516 S.E.2d at 478.
361. See id. at 10, 516 S.E.2d at 479.
362. See id. (Keenan, J., dissenting).
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because evidence of this nature could be admitted through the
business records exception, as long as a proper foundation is laid.363
In Pitt v. Commonwealth,364 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that a nontestifying codefendant's statements to a
detective were not admissible against the defendant under the
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.365 The facts
at trial indicate that the defendant and codefendant were arrested
and taken to police headquarters in connection with an attempted
robbery. They both waived their Miranda rights and made statements. Thereafter, they were indicted for attempted robbery. The
court granted the Commonwealth's pretrial motion for a joint trial.
During the joint trial, the Commonwealth introduced a tape of the
codefendant's statement. In this statement, the codefendant said
that the defendant approached the victim in order to obtain crack
cocaine.
hen the victim did not give the defendant cocaine, the
defendant started wrestling with the victim and the codefendant
then "wrestled" the victim to the ground "like a football tackle" to
protect the defendant.3 6 The codefendant also stated that "he saw
the [defendant] try to pry open the victim's mouth in order to take
cocaine [he] believed was hidden there." 6 The codefendant asserted

his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to
testify. The trial court instructed the jury that the codefendant's
statement was not to be used as evidence against the defendant.369
The court of appeals held that the codefendant's statements were
not statements made against his penal interest and were therefore
inadmissible against the defendant. 7 6 The court came to this
conclusion because they found that at the time he made this
statement, the codefendant was not aware that his statements,
especially those which incriminated the defendant, were made
against his own penal interest.3 ' However, the court held that the
admission of the codefendant's statements was harmless error.37 2 In

363. See id. at 11, 516 S.E.2d at 479 (Keenan, J., dissenting). The majority contended that
the evidence did not fall within the business records exception because a proper foundation
was not laid. See id. at 9, n.3, 516 S.E.2d at 478, n.3.
364. 28 Va. App. 730, 508 S.E.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1999).
365. See id. at 742-43, 508 S.E.2d at 897-98.
366. See id. at 734-35, 737, 508 S.E.2d at 894-95.
367. Id. at 738, 508 S.E.2d at 895.
368. Id.
369. See id. at 738, 508 S.E.2d at 895-96.
370. See id. at 742-43, 508 S.E.2d at 897-98.
371. See id.
372. See id. at 756, 508 S.E.2d at 904.
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addition, the panel stated that the codefendant's statement was
admissible because it was "trust-worthy" and did not violate the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 3
E. PriorCrimes
In Dunbarv. Commonwealth, 4 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that the defendant's admission that he sold cocaine to
make ends meet established a "general scheme" of drug sales and
was admissible as evidence of prior crimes in his trial for possession
of cocaine with the intent to distribute. 75 During the trial, the
arresting officer testified that the defendant responded "yes" when
asked "if he sold a little [cocaine] to make ends meet."376
In Boney v. Commonwealth,377 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions, holding that the
admission of "other crimes" was erroneous. 7 ' In this case, the
defendant was charged with the malicious wounding of his wife and
the killing of her lover. Over the defendant's objections, the trial
court allowed evidence of prior assaults by the defendant in 1992 and
1993.379 The defendant's wife testified that "quite a few times" she
had been involved "in a situation with [the defendant] and a gun."38
She testified vaguely about an incident in 1992 between the defendant and herself. The defendant stipulated that he had been
convicted of assault and battery as a result of a 1993 incident
involving his wife, himself, and another man. The trial court
instructed the jury to consider the conviction only as evidence of the
defendant's motive and intent.8 1

373. See id. at 754-56, 508 S.E.2d at 903-04. Judge Lemons concurred in the result that

the defendant's statement was admissible. See id. at 761, 508 S.E.2d at 907 (Lemons, J.,
concurring). Judge Benton also filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. See id. at 763, 508 S.E.2d at 908 (Benton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The court of appeals held that based on the decision in Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968), the trial court's limiting instruction was insufficient to prevent prejudice to
the defendant and constituted an abuse of discretion. This abuse ofdiscretion was harmless,
however, because there was other evidence that "overwhelmingly proved" the defendant
attempted to rob the victim. See Pitt,28 Va. App. at 746-48, 508 S.E.2d at 899-900.
374. 29 Va. App. 387, 512 S.E.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1999).
375. See id. at 392-93, 512 S.E.2d at 826.
376. Id. at 389, 512 S.E.2d at 824.
377. 29 Va. App. 795, 514 S.E.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1999).
378. See id. at 802, 514 S.E.2d at 813. The defendant was convicted of burglary, first
degree murder, malicious wounding, and related firearms offenses. See id. at 800,514 S.E.2d
at 812.
379. See id. at 799-800, 514 S.E.2d at 812.
380. Id.
381. See id. at 799-800, 514 S.E.2d at 812.
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The court of appeals held that the trial court's admission of both
the wife's testimony and the defendant's prior assault and battery
conviction was erroneous because the evidence was not probative of
the defendant's motive or intent in the instant case and was highly
prejudicial to the defendant." 2 The court held that:
[elvidence of other crimes is relevant and admissible if it tends to prove any
element of the offense charged, including the intent of the accused [as long
as there is] a causal relation or logical or natural connection between the two
acts, or they... form parts of one transaction, with sufficient probative value
to overcome the incidental prejudice to the accused.3"

F. Rape Shield Law
In Brown v. Commonwealth,"s4 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions, and held that the trial
court erred in refusing to strike two prospective jurors and that
evidence of a complaining witness's prior testimony in an unrelated
rape prosecution does not fall under the rape shield law."8 5
In this case, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to strike
three prospective jurors for cause. The first prospective juror "had
been the victim of an attempted abduction and [an] attempted sexual
assault."8 6 She was unable to tell the trial court, undoubtedly, that
this would not affect her ability to make a decision. 7 The second
prospective juror was the Chief Counsel to the United States Secret
Service and when questioned, he stated that "he might give more
weight to an officer's testimony."3 8 The third prospective juror stated
ashe knew [the defendant] 'from the area.'"3 9 The Commonwealth
removed her with its fourth peremptory strike.9 '
The panel held that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the
first juror for cause because her responses "created [a] reasonable
doubt about her fitness as a juror."39 ' The court of appeals also held

382. See id. at 801, 514 S.E.2d at 813.
383. Id. (citing Guill v.Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134,138-40,495 S.E.2d 489,491-92 (1998))
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
384. 29 Va. App. 199, 510 S.E.2d 751 (Ct. App. 1999).
385. See id. at 202, 510 S.E.2d at 752. The defendant was convicted of attempted rape,
forcible sodomy, animate object sexual penetration, abduction, robbery, and assault. See id.
386. Id. at 204, 510 S.E.2d at 753.
387. See id. at 204-05, 510 S.E.2d at 753-54.
388. Id. at 208, 510 S.E.2d at 755.
389. Id. at 210, 510 S.E.2d at 756.
390. See id. at 211, 510 S.E.2d at 757.
391. Id. at 208, 510 S.E.2d at 755.
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that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the second juror for
cause because his comments also "created a reasonable doubt about
his ability to sit impartially."392 In reference to the third prospective
juror, the court of appeals found that her knowledge of the defendant
was not sufficient to disqualify her from serving on the jury.3 93 On a
peripheral matter, the court stated that the Commonwealth's use of
a peremptory strike to remove the juror would not have cured any
prejudice to the defendant.394
In Brown, the court of appeals also decided whether the trial court
erred in refusing to allow the victim to be questioned about her
testimony in a prior, unrelated rape case. 95 The court found that the
victim's testimony in the earlier, unrelated rape trial did not fall
within the definition of "prior sexual conduct" in the rape shield
law.396 The panel held that the defendant sought to question the
victim about her previous testimony, not her previous sexual
conduct, so it was not protected by the rape shield law. 97
G. Relevant Evidence at Sentencing
The issue before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Commonwealth
v. Shifflett,398 was whether two circuit courts erred in limiting the
evidence the defendants sought to introduce during the sentencing
phase of their bifurcated noncapital jury trials.399 In addressing this
issue, the court analyzed Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1, and the
meaning of the term "relevant."400
The case before the supreme court involved two separate criminal
appeals. In the first case ajury found the defendant, Shifflett, guilty
of a second or subsequent offense of operating a motor vehicle on a
public highway after being declared an habitual offender.4° ' Prior to
sentencing, defense counsel informed the court that he intended to
introduce "mitigating testimony about the defendant's employment
[and] his family responsibilities."0 2 The trial court ruled that the

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. at 210, 510 S.E.2d at 756.
See id. at 211, 510 S.E.2d at 757.
See id. at 212, 510 S.E.2d at 757.
See id. at 202, 510 S.E.2d at 752-53.
See id. at 216, 510 S.E.2d at 759.
See id.
257 Va. 34, 510 S.E.2d 232 (1999).
See id. at 37, 510 S.E.2d at 233.
See id.
See id. at 38, 510 S.E.2d at 233.
Id.
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mitigating evidence would be limited to the following factors: "range
of punishment established by legislature, injury to the victim, use of
weapon, extent of offender's participation, the offense, offender's
motive in committing the offense, prior record and rehabilitative
efforts, drug and alcohol use, age, health and education.' 0 After the
jury returned its sentence and before the judge sentenced the
defendant, the defendant's employer testified." 4
A panel of the court of appeals held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow testimony concerning the
financial impact that incarceration would have on the defendant's
family and employment because it was not relevant evidence for the
jury to consider in sentencing.0 5 Upon a rehearing en banc, the court
of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for
a new sentencing proceeding, holding that the testimony of the
defendant's family responsibilities and employment was offered to
show his character, his propensities, and his positive contribution to
his family.40 6
In the second case before the supreme court, a jury found the
defendant, Taylor, guilty of conspiracy to distribute marijuana,
possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, and transportation of marijuana into Virginia with the intent to distribute.0 7
During the sentencing phase, the trial court ruled that evidence
"relating [his] whole [life] story" was not relevant and therefore
inadmissible. 4 8 The trial court permitted the defendant to testify
about his education, his work experience, and the circumstances
surrounding his previous convictions. Several days later, the trial
court granted the defendant's request to insert a proffer of testimony
into the record. At a post-trial hearing, the defendant testified about
his family life; however, the trial court denied the defendant's
motion, holding that the motion was untimely and the evidence was
not relevant to sentencing. 4 9 In an unpublished panel opinion, the

403. Id.
404. See id. at 39, 510 S.E.2d at 234.
405. See Shiffiett v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 538, 543, 484 S.E.2d 134, 136 (Ct. App.
1997).
406. See Shiffiettv. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 254,256,261,494 S.E.2d 163,164,166-67
(Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
407. See Shifflett, 257 Va. at 40, 510 S.E.2d at 234.
408. Id. at 40-41, 510 S.E.2d at 234-35.
409. See id. at 41-42, 510 S.E.2d at 235.
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court of appeals reversed the trial court's finding and remanded the
case for a new sentencing proceeding, stating that the decision was
controlled by the court of appeals's en banc decision in Shifflett.41 °
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned that the
General Assembly created Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1 with the
factors that are considered relevant in capital cases.41 ' Therefore, the
factors that are relevant in noncapital cases should be limited to
those factors that are relevant in capital cases.412 In the first case,
the supreme court held that the court of appeals erroneously created
bases for admission of the testimony about Shifflett's family
responsibilities and employment that were never presented to the
trial court.413 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding
and held "that the trial court... did not abuse ... its discretion by

refusing to allow evidence [about] the impact of the defendant's
incarceration on his family and... employment." 4 In the second
case, the supreme court found that the court of appeals erred in
The
relying on the proffered testimony in making its decision.'
court also affirmed the trial court's finding in the second case, and
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
allow evidence of the defendant's life history.41
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Enhanced Sentencing
In Batts v. Commonwealth,41 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's sentence for use of a firearm in the
commission of a robbery, finding that the enhanced mandatory fiveyear sentence lacked a valid predicate conviction and exceeded the
statutory authority of the jury.41

410. See id. at 42, 510 S.E.2d at 235.
411. See id. at 42, 510 S.E.2d at 236.
412. See id. at42-43,510 S.E.2d at 236. Those mitigating factors include the following: (1)
evidence of no significant history of criminal activity; (2) evidence that defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (3) evidence that the victim was
a participant or consented to the act; (4) evidence that the defendant lacked the capacity; (5)
the age of the defendant; and (6) extenuating circumstances that tend to explain, but not
excuse, the crime. See id. at 43, 510 S.E.2d at 236.
413. See id. at 44,510 S.E.2d at 237.
414. Id. at 45, 510 S.E.2d at 237.
415. See id.
416. See id.
417. 30 Va. App. 1, 515 S.E.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999).
418. See id. at 16, 515 S.E.2d at 315.
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In this case, the defendant tried to prevent the Commonwealth
from using a prior firearm conviction as an enhancer in his trial on
a different charge of robbery and use of a firearm in the commission
of a robbery.419 At the time of the trial in the instant case, the
defendant was awaiting sentencing on the earlier firearm
conviction.420 When the court refused to rule on the motion and
agreed to grant the Commonwealth a continuance, the defendant's
counsel "conceded the legal point" and "agreed" to the jury instruction which allowed for the enhanced mandatory five-year sentence.4
At the conclusion of the evidence, "when the trial judge asked
[defendant's] counsel if he had an objection to the proposed Ljury]
instruction, counsel stated, '[t]hat's acceptable." 4 22 The case was then

continued for sentencing. In the interim, the defendant's earlier
firearm conviction was set aside and he was convicted of two other
unrelated firearm charges and sentenced to three years on the first
and five years on the second. The defendant then filed a motion to set
aside the verdict in the instant case, alleging that the enhanced
sentence jury instruction was improper. 42" The trial judge sentenced
the defendant to five years on the firearm charge stating that
although "circumstances changed, which might have allowed [him]
. . . to impose a lesser sentence," things "have gone
all the way
424
around again and have come back to the beginning."
The court of appeals held that the jury instruction provided an
incorrect statement of law because there was no evidence to support
enhanced punishment for a "second or subsequent conviction."4" The
court found the defendant "was subjected to a maximum mandatory
sentence that was not [statutorily] authorized at the time the jury
determined his... punishment"
and remanded the case for a new
426
sentencing proceeding.

419. See id. at 5, 515 S.E.2d at 309-10.
420. See id. at 6, 515 S.E.2d at 310.
421. Id. at 7-8, 515 S.E.2d at 310-11. The defendant's counsel attempted to note his
objection on the record concerning the court's refusal to rule on the motion in limine and
decision to grant the Commonwealth a continuance. Rather than allow the court to continue
the case, the defendant's counsel agreed to the jury instruction. The Commonwealth
requested a continuance, alleging that the defendant's attorney had the first case continued
for tactical reasons. See id. at 5-8, 515 S.E.2d at 309-11.
422. Id. at 8, 515 S.E.2d at 311.
423. See id. at 9, 515 S.E.2d at 311.
424. Id. at 9-10, 515 S.E.2d at 311-12.
425. Id. at 12, 515 S.E.2d at 313.
426. Id. at 16, 515 S.E.2d at 315.
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B. "Highway"Defined
In Roberts v. Commonwealth,4 27 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction for driving after being
adjudicated an habitual offender and held that a convenience store
parking lot is not a "highway" as defined in the Virginia Code.428 The
facts in this case indicate that the officer "observed [the defendant]
driving a white van through the parking lot of a 7-Eleven" store.4 29
After stopping the defendant and arresting him for being drunk in
public, the officer found that he "had been adjudicated an habitual
offender and his license to operate a motor vehicle had been suspended."4"' The officer "testified that he did not see any traffic signs
within the parking lot" and that the "lot was accessible to the public
by five entrances." The 7-Eleven store manager testified that the
store was owned by a private corporation, which contracted with
another company for the maintenance of the parking lot.4 32 She
testified that she was authorized to ask people to leave the property,
and on occasion she had called the police who charged the people
with trespassing. 433 The court of appeals held that "based upon the
restricted public access to the premises, the parking lot of the 7a 'highway' as defined by [Virginia] Code
Eleven store was4 not
4
section 46.2-100." 3
C. Insanity Defense
In Jones v. Commonwealth,"5 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions for murder and use of
a firearm in the commission of that murder, holding that the trial
court committed reversible error when it refused to allow the
defendant to present expert testimony concerning her insanity
defense unless she changed her plea to not guilty by reason of
insanity.43 6 The court of appeals found that the defendant complied
with the requirements of Virginia Code sections 19.2-254 and 19.2-

427. 28 Va. App. 401, 504 S.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1998).
428. See id. at 406, 504 S.E.2d at 892.
429. Id. at 402, 504 S.E.2d at 890.

430. Id.
431. Id.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

See id. at 403, 504 S.E.2d at 891.
See id.
Id. at 406, 504 S.E.2d at 892.
28 Va. App. 444, 506 S.E.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 445, 449, 506 S.E.2d at 27, 30.
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168... when she pled not guilty at her arraignment, and held that
there is no legal requirement that the defendant enter a formal plea
by reason of insanity before presenting evidence of
of not guilty
8
insanity.4
D. ParoleEligibility
A panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals in Hanson v. Commonwealth439 held that a "defendant's parole ineligibility is . .. not a
factor that juries... [are] permitted to consider in determining [a
defendant's] sentence" in a murder trial. 440
E. Possession of Tools with the Intent to Commit Larceny
In Mercer v. Commonwealth,"1 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that the evidence supported the jury's finding that the
defendant's altered pants were an "outfit"that he possessed with the
intent to utilize them to commit larceny. 442 In this case, a store
employee observed the defendant place two boxes of Nicorette gum
into his pants pocket. The items slid down the defendant's leg to his
ankle, but did not hit the floor. The defendant's left pants pocket was
cut open and there was a drawstring at the cuffs of the pants legs.
This allowed an item to fall from the
pocket, down the defendant's
3
leg, without falling onto the floor."
F. Right to Appeal and Motion to Reopen
In Commonwealth v. Zamani,4 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that: (1) the defendant's appearance in circuit court did not
constitute the case being "heard"; (2) the general district court has
the authority to modify and reverse its original judgment; and (3) the
defendant may simultaneously pursue an appeal in circuit court and
an application to reopen in general district court.445

437.
168).
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

See id. at 447,506 S.E.2d at 29 (discussing Virginia Code sections 19.2-254 and 19.2See id. at 447-48, 506 S.E.2d at 29.
29 Va. App. 69, 509 S.E.2d 543 (Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 81-82, 509 S.E.2d at 549.
29 Va. App. 380, 512 S.E.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999).
See id. at 385,512 S.E.2d at 175.
See id. at 383, 512 S.E.2d at 174. The Nicorette gum was valued at $110. See id.
256 Va. 391, 507 S.E.2d 608 (1998).
See id. at 396-98, 507 S.E.2d at 610-11.
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On March 21, 1996, the defendant was convicted in general
district court of two misdemeanor sexual battery charges and
received suspended jail sentences."4 The defendant noted his appeal
to the circuit court on the same day. On April 8, 1996, the defendant
appeared in circuit court, waived his right to a jury trial, and agreed
to a continuance. On April 12, 1996, the defendant reappeared in the
general district court where the case was reopened. After hearing
additional evidence, the general district court found that there was
sufficient evidence to convict, but withheld final adjudications until
a later date. On April 19, 1996, the defendant appeared in circuit
court to withdraw his appeal.' 7 The circuit court denied his motion,
however, and ruled that the case had been transferred to the circuit
court on appeal and that the general district court no longer had
jurisdiction. The circuit court then affirmed the original suspended
jail sentence.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the circuit
court with directions to vacate its order and remand the case to the
general district court for entry of its April 12, 1996 order.44 9 Using
familiar principles of statutory construction, the supreme court
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the
language of Virginia Code section 16.1-133.1450 clearly demonstrates
the intent to provide a defendant with the opportunity of both an
appeal to circuit court and an application to reopen in general
district court. 51 The supreme court analyzed the definition of the
term "heard" as found in Virginia Code section 16.1-133.1,452 and
held that the incidents on April 8, 1996, were merely procedural and
that a de novo hearing must occur before a general district court's
jurisdiction is terminated.453
G. Sentencing Deferred for Mental Examination
In Simerly v. Commonwealth,454 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions for rape, abduction with
the intent to defile, and malicious wounding, holding that the trial

446.
447.
448.
449.
1997).
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

See id. at 394, 507 S.E.2d at 609.
See id. at 394, 507 S.E.2d at 608-09.
See id. at 395, 507 S.E.2d at 609.
See Zamani v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 59, 66, 492 S.E.2d 854, 858 (Ct. App.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-133.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
See Zamani, 256 Va. at 397-98, 507 S.E.2d at 611-12.
See id. at 396, 507 S.E.2d at 610.
See id. at 396-97, 507 S.E.2d at 610.
29 Va. App. 710, 514 S.E.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1999).
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court erred when it refused to defer sentencing and order a mental
examination pursuant to Virginia Code section 19.2-300. 4"' The court
found that Virginia Code section 19.2-300 gives a defendant, who has
been convicted of an offense that "indicates sexual abnormality," the
right to a mental examination.456 The statute mandates that the
court order such an examination upon the defendant's request.457 The

court pointed out the difference between Virginia Code sections 19.2300 and 19.2-176, stating that section 19.2-176 provides the trial
judge with discretion to order a mental evaluation after conviction
and before sentencing, "[ilf

. .

. the judge . . . finds reasonable

ground[s] to question [the defendant's] mental state.45
H. Single Larceny Doctrine
In Acey v. Commonwealth,459 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant
had the requisite intent to commit larceny; however, only a single
conviction for larceny and a single conviction for possession of a
firearm were warranted. 461 The facts at trial indicate that the
defendant entered a friend's home with permission and drank some
beer. The defendant testified that his friend told him to get rid of the
guns. Neither the friend nor the arresting officer remembered this
statement. The defendant then removed a shotgun from the closet,
a handgun from a holster in the bedroom, and a handgun from the
dresser. The defendant placed the firearms in his friend's car and
drove to his own house, where he called the police and others and
told them he was armed and suicidal. Upon leaving his house, the
defendant was pulled over by a state trooper and arrested. The
defendant was convicted on three counts of larceny of a firearm and
three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon.461
The court of appeals held that the circumstances of this case
entitled the trial court to infer that the defendant maintained the
requisite intent when he took the weapons. 4 2 The court also found
that the defendant's actions fell within the scope of the single larceny

455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

See id. at 712, 514 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 713, 514 S.E.2d at 389 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-300 (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
See id.
Id. at 717, 514 S.E.2d at 391 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-176(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
29 Va. App. 240, 511 S.E.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1999).
See id. at 246-51, 511 S.E.2d at 431-34.
See id. at 245-46, 511 S.E.2d at 431-32.
See id. at 246-47, 511 S.E.2d at 432.
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doctrine and that this doctrine should be applied to larceny of a
firearm.46 Finally, the court held that when the defendant possessed
the three firearms, he committed a single offense.464
I. "Speedy Trial"Statute
In Powell v. Commonwealth,465 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions for second-degree
murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a murder, holding
466
that the defendant's statutory speedy trial rights were violated.
The defendant was arrested on January 26, 1996. On March 19,
1996, the juvenile and domestic relations court found probable cause
and certified the matters to the grand jury. The defendant was
indicted in May 1996. On October 9, 1996, the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges, stating that there was a
continuance on the motion of the defendant. However, the record
does not reveal an order by the circuit court judge setting the case for
trial or an order for a continuance. The defendant's original attorney
also testified
that he could not recall requesting a continuance in this
46 7
case.

J. Transcripts
In Commonwealth v. Harley,68 the Supreme Court of Virginia
made a very narrow ruling that the Commonwealth lacked standing
to appeal as an aggrieved party469 and that the issue of providing free
transcripts to indigent criminal defendants was mooted by the court
of appeals's ruling that the denial of the free transcript was harmless.470

463.
464.
465.
466.

See id. at 247-49, 511 S.E.2d at 432-33.
See id. at 251,511 S.E.2d at 434.
29 Va. App. 745, 514 S.E.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1999).
See id. at 751, 514 S.E.2d at 788. That statute provides, in pertinent part:
Where a general district court has found that there is probable cause to believe that the
accused has committed a felony, the accused, if he is held continuously in custody
thereafter, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for such offense if no trial is
commenced in the circuit court within five months from the date such probable cause
was found by the district court.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cune. Supp. 1999).
467. See Powell, 29 Va. App. at 747, 749, 514 S.E.2d at 786-87.
468. 256 Va. 216, 504 S.E.2d 852 (1998).
469. See id. at 218,504 S.E.2d at 854. The Commonwealth asserted it had standing as an
"aggrieved party" under the meaning of Virginia Code section 17-116.08. See id. at 218, 504
S.E.2d at 853; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.08 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).

470. See Harley, 256 Va. at 218, 504 S.E.2d at 852.
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The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a transcript of
a suppression hearing at the state's expense.4 7 ' The court of appeals
held that the defendant was constitutionally entitled to a free
transcript of the suppression hearing; however, the denial of this
transcript was harmless error and the convictions were affirmed.47 2
The Commonwealth sought reversal of the court of appeals's ruling
that the defendant was constitutionally entitled to a free transcript
of the suppression hearing because it would lead to "the squandering
of substantial amounts of public monies."47 3
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Commonwealth is
not aggrieved by the court of appeals's ruling because the issue
was rendered moot by the final judgment of the court of appeals.4 74
The court limited its holding to this case only, stating that "the
harmless error ruling avoided the 'imposition of a burden' upon the
Commonwealth and the 'squandering of...
public monies' on
'transcripts... of pre-trial proceedings."47 5
K. Trespass
A panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals decided another case of
first impression in Holland v. Commonwealth.4 76 The court held that
police officers "had the power to accept [a] property manager's
authority to bar any specified individual from the property" because
this power allowed the police to prevent crime, protect property, and
preserve the peace.47 7 In this case, a housing manager executed a
power of attorney appointing all members of the Leesburg Police
Department as her agents. The power of attorney gave the police the
power to issue barment notices to unauthorized individuals present
on the property. A Leesburg police officer issued a barment notice to
the defendant that stated the defendant would be arrested for
trespassing if he returned to the property. Four months later, the
defendant was arrested for trespassing on the property. The court of
appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction.4 78

471. See id. at 217, 504 S.E.2d at 852-53.
472. See Harley v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 342, 350-51, 488 S.E.2d 647, 650-51 (Ct.
App. 1997).
473. Harley, 256 Va. at 218, 504 S.E.2d at 853.
474. See id. at 219, 504 S.E.2d at 853.
475. Id. at 219, 504 S.E.2d at 854.
476. 28 Va. App. 67, 502 S.E.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1998).
477. Id. at 75, 502 S.E.2d at 149.
478. See id. at 68-70, 502 S.E.2d at 145-46.
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L. UnanimousVerdict
InHumbert v. Commonwealth,47 9 a panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions for assault and battery
on a law enforcement officer and possession of cocaine, holding that
the record did not support a finding that the guilty verdict was

unanimous.48 °
During the jury's deliberations, the trial court brought the jury
back into the courtroom three different times. The first time, the
trial judge informed the jury it was getting late and that if they did
not return a verdict soon, they would have to come back in the
morning."' The judge also addressed the jury's concerns about
differences of opinion they were having on the issue of assault and
battery, by stating that, "[t]here is no difference of opinion on
assault.... The law is the law.... I don't know what would be the
problem unless somebody just wants to be arbitrary."4 8 2 During the
second time, the trial judge asked the jury if they thought they could
reach a unanimous verdict. Several jurors indicated that they could
not, one stated that they could, and one indicated that he or she did
not think the defendant was guilty. When the jury was brought back
a third time, they had reached a verdict of guilty on both charges.
However, when the trial judge polled the jury, the eleventh juror was
unable to confirm that she supported the guilty verdicts.4 83
The court of appeals held that the circumstances surrounding the
jury's deliberations revealed a "coerceive effect" on the eleventh
juror's response to the jury poll and the trial court erred in concluding the verdict was unanimous.4 4

IX. 1999 LEGISLATION
In 1999, there were several major legislative developments in the
field of criminal law. Some of the more important developments are
summarized below.

479. 29 Va. App. 783, 514 S.E.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1999).
480. See id. at 794, 514 S.E.2d at 809-10.
481. See id. at 787-88, 514 S.E.2d at 806.
482. Id.
483. See id. at 787-89,514 S.E.2d at 806-07. The eleventh juror appeared to be crying and
her initial response to the trial judge was, "I can't say it." She then shook her head
"affirmatively" and eventually gave a verbal response of "yes." See id. at 788-89, 514 S.E.2d
at 806-07.
484. See id. at 794, 514 S.E.2d at 809-10.
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The General Assembly enhanced the penalty provision of Virginia
Code section 18.2-33 from a Class 3 felony to confinement in a state
correctional
facility for not less than five years nor more than forty
4 85
years.
Virginia Code section 18.2-36.1 was amended to require a court to
revoke the driver's license of anyone convicted of involuntary
manslaughter while driving under the influence.4 8 6 Virginia Code
section 18.2-51.4 was also amended to require the same action be
taken for anyone convicted of maiming, or like offenses, resulting
from driving while intoxicated.48 7
Virginia Code section 18.2-38 was amended and section 18.2-42.1
was added to include certain acts of violence, in addition to assault
and battery, which if committed by a collection of persons, would
make the acts crimes by a mob.488
Virginia Code section 18.2-57 was amended to include assault and
battery against a correctional officer.4 89 Subsection "D" has been
deleted, however, this subsection's mandatory minimum term of six

months has been included in subsection

° Virginia
"C." 49

Code section

18.2-57 was also amended to enhance the penalty provision for the
battery of a teacher, principal, or guidance counselor. It now provides
for a mandatory two-day period of incarceration and a mandatory six
months if a gun or other weapon that is prohibited on school property
is used.4 9 '
Virginia Code sections 18.2-61, 18.2-67.1, and 18.2-67.2 were
amended to require only bodily injury rather than "serious physical"
injury as an element of rape, forcible sodomy, and object sexual

485. See Act of Mar. 22, 1999, ch. 282, 1999 Va. Acts 325 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-33 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
486. See Act of Apr. 7, 1999, ch. 945, 1999 Va. Acts 2440 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-36.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
487. See Act of Apr. 7, 1999, ch. 987, 1999 Va. Acts 2611 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-51.4 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
488. See Act of Apr. 6, 1999, ch. 612, 1999 Va. Acts 950 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-38, -42.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
489. See Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 771, 1999 Va. Acts 1355 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
490. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
491. See Act of May 7, 1999, ch. 1036, 1999 Va. Acts 2739 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-57(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
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penetration. 492 Virginia Code section 18.2-67.2:1 was also amended
to include intimidation against the spouse as a requirement for
marital sexual assault.4 9
The General Assembly added a new section to the Virginia Code,
section 18.2-64.2, that makes carnal knowledge of an inmate,
parolee, probationer, or pretrial or post-trial offender a Class 6
felony.49 4 This section requires the accused to be an employee in a
position of authority over the victim, to have knowledge that the
victim is under the jurisdiction of the correctional facility, and to
have carnal knowledge of the victim. 495 This chapter also amends
section 18.2-67.4, making the sexual battery of an inmate, parolee,
or pretrial or posttrial offender a Class 1 misdeprobationer,
496
meanor.
Virginia Code section 18.2-130 was amended to state that secretly
or furtively peeping, spying, or attempting to do so through a
peephole, with the intent to see someone nude or partially dressed,
is punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.4 97
Virginia Code sections 18.2-247 and 54.1-3401 were amended so
that the definition of marijuana now includes (i) any oily extract
containing less than twelve percent of THC by weight, when the oily
extract is mixed or intermingled with marijuana, and (ii) the mature
stalks, fibers, oil, or cake made from the seeds of the plant if mixed
with other parts of the plant.498
Virginia Code section 18.2-270 was amended by enhancing the
penalty provision for a third DUI offense within ten years to a Class
6 felony.499 Further, the fourth and subsequent offenses now carry a
one-year mandatory minimum jail sentence. That section also
contains the following amendments: (1) a person whose license is
suspended following a DUI conviction must remain on probation for

492. See Act of Mar. 22,1999, ch. 294,1999 Va. Acts 339 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-61, -67.1, -67.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
493. See Act of Mar. 24, 1999, ch. 367,1999 Va. Acts 419 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
494. See Act of Mar. 22,1999, ch. 294,1999 Va. Acts 339 (codified atVA. CODEANN. § 18.264.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
495. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-64.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
496. See Act of Mar. 22,1999, ch. 294,1999 Va. Acts 339 (codified as amended at VA. CODE'
ANN. § 18.2-67.4 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
497. See Act of Mar. 24, 1999, ch. 351,1999 Va. Acts 398 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-130 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
498. See Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 661, 1999 Va. Acts 1054 (codified as amended at VA.
CODEANN. §§ 18.2-247, 54.1-3401 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
499. See Act of Apr. 7, 1999, ch. 987, 1999 Va. Acts 2611 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-270 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
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the same period as the suspension, not to exceed three years; (2) first
and second time DUI offenders will be required to attend the VASAP
program; and (3) the fine for a DUI conviction while transporting a
minor will increase from a minimum of $100 and maximum of $500
to a minimum of $500 and a maximum of $1,000.0
The penalty provision of Virginia Code section 18.2-280 was
enhanced to a Class 6 felony for any person who willfully discharges
any firearm in public that results in bodily injury to another
person. 50 ' If such conduct does not result in bodily injury to another
person, the offense is a Class 1 misdemeanor. Subsection "D" allows
the Commonwealth to prosecute under any other applicable law
instead of this section. 0 2
Virginia Code section 18.2-308.1 was amended to include knives
with metal blades of three inches or longer (except for butter knives
and implements used for food50 preparation)
on the list of weapons
3
prohibited on school property.
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections 18.2308.1, 18.2-308.2, and 18.2-308.4 to create Virginia's Project Exile,
which is similar to the federal "Project Exile."0 4 These changes
provide that any person convicted of (i) possessing a firearm on
school grounds with the intent to use it or display it in a threatening
manner,0 5 (ii) possessing a firearm after having been previously
convicted of a violent felony, 0 6 or (iii) simultaneously possessing a
firearm and drugs with the intent to sell 0 7 is ineligible for probation
and will be sentenced to a minimum, mandatory term of imprisonment of five years, which cannot be suspended or served consecutively with any other sentence. This imprisonment term can be
reduced to two years only if the felon's prior felony was nonviolent.0 8

500. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270 (Cur. Supp. 1999).
501. See Act of Mar. 22,1999, ch. 282,1999 Va. Acts 325 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-280 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
502. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-280(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
503. See Act of Mar. 27, 1999, ch. 587, 1999 Va. Acts 905 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
504. See Act of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. 846, 1999 Va. Acts 1344 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-308.1, -308.2, -308.4 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). In creating Virginia's Project
Exile, this chapter amends numerous other Virginia Code sections and adds section 19.2-80.2,
which deals with the arresting officer's duty to provide the magistrate with the defendant's
criminal history. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-80.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
505.

See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).

506. See id. § 18.2-308.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
507. See id. § 18.2-308.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
508. See id. §§ 18.2-308.1, -308.2, -308.4 (Cum Supp. 1999).
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The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 18.2-391 to
include the selling, renting, or loaning to juveniles electronic files or
messages that contain images depicting sexually explicit nudity,
sexual conduct, or sadomasochistic abuse, as well as any electronic
file or message that contains words descriptive of any matter
enumerated
above. Any violation of this section is a Class 1 misde09
meanor.

Virginia Code section 19.2-71 was amended to provide that no law
enforcement officer can seek issuance of process by any judicial
officer for the arrest of a person for the offense of capital murder
without prior authorization by the Commonwealth's Attorney.1 0
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2-299 to
require a thorough presentence report when the defendant pleads
guilty without a plea agreement or is found guilty by the court after
a plea of not guilty."'
Virginia Code section 17.1-805 was amended to include the
following violations as "violent felony" offenses: (1) any violation of
section 18.2-36.1; (2) any violation of sections 18.2-40, 18.2-41, or
18.2-67.5:1 involving a third conviction of either sexual battery or
attempted sexual battery; (3) any Class 4 felony violation of section
18.2-154; and (4) any Class 4 felony violation of section 18.2-155.1'
Virginia Code section 16.1-263 was amended to require the
juvenile and domestic relations court to notify only "a parent" rather
than both parents when a petition has been filed. 13
The General Assembly repealed Virginia Code sections 46.2-351
through 46.2-355, which allowed for the determination and adjudication provisions of the Habitual Offender Act. 1 4

509. See Act ofApr. 7, 1999, ch. 936,1999 Va. Acts 2428 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-391 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
510. See Act of Mar. 29,1999, ch. 266,1999 Va. Acts 310 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-71 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
511. See Act of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. 903, 1999 Va. Acts 1741 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-299 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
512. See Act of Mar. 24,1999, ch. 349,1999 Va. Acts 394 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-805 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
513. See Act ofApr. 7,1999, ch.952,1999 Va. Acts 2487 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-263 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
514. See Act of Apr. 14, 1999, ch. 945 & 987, 1999 Va. Acts 2440 & 2611. The General
Assembly retained the restoration provisions in the Habitual Offender Act. See VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 46.2-360 to -361 (Cum. Supp. 1999).

918

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:857

Virginia Code section 46.2-817 was amended to include any person
who attempts to escape or elude a law-enforcement officer.5 1 5 The
statute now requires willful and wanton disregard of the officer's
signals and the penalty has been increased to a Class 6 felony. If a
person charged under this provision reasonably believes he was
being pursued by someone other than a law enforcement officer, he
may raise this as an affirmative defense. Misdemeanor convictions
under this section now require suspension of the driver's license by
the court
for a period of not less than thirty days nor more than one
516
year.
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 3.1-796.122
stating that a second or subsequent animal cruelty offense within
five years will be a Class 6 felony if either offense resulted in the
death or euthanasia of an animal. 517 A court may require any person
convicted of an animal cruelty violation to pay for and attend an
anger management or other treatment program or obtain psychiatric
or psychological counseling.5 18
The General Assembly added section 3.1-796.128:2 to the Virginia
Code.5 19 This section prohibits the sale of garments containing
domestic dog or cat fur. A violation of this section will be punishable
by a fine of not more than $10,000. 20

515. See Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 720, 1999 Va. Acts 1200 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-817 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
516. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-817 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
517. See Act of Mar. 17,1999, ch. 209, 1999 Va. Acts 233 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. § 3.1-796.122 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).

518. See VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.122 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
519. See Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 678, 1999 Va. Acts 1097 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1796.128:2 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).

520. See VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.128:2 (Cure. Supp. 1999).

